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Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations
Siddharth Barman∗, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy†, Rohit Vaish‡
Abstract
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and
efficientmanner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means
that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other agent up to the removal of one
good. In addition, an allocation is deemed efficient if it satisfies Pareto efficiency. While each of
these well-studied properties is easy to achieve separately, achieving them together is far from ob-
vious. Recently, Caragiannis et al. (2016) established the surprising result that when agents have
additive valuations for the goods, there always exists an allocation that simultaneously satisfies
these two seemingly incompatible properties. Specifically, they showed that an allocation that
maximizes the Nash social welfare objective is both EF1 and Pareto efficient. However, the prob-
lem of maximizing Nash social welfare is NP-hard. As a result, this approach does not provide an
efficient algorithm for finding a fair and efficient allocation.
In this paper, we bypass this barrier, and develop a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for find-
ing allocations that are EF1 and Pareto efficient; in particular, when the valuations are bounded,
our algorithm finds such an allocation in polynomial time. Furthermore, we establish a stronger
existence result compared to Caragiannis et al. (2016): For additive valuations, there always exists
an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient.
Another key contribution of our work is to show that our algorithm provides a polynomial-
time 1.45-approximation to the Nash social welfare objective. This improves upon the best known
approximation ratio for this problem (namely, the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al., 2017),
and also matches the lower bound on the integrality gap of the convex program of Cole et al.
(2017). Unlike many of the existing approaches, our algorithm is completely combinatorial, and
relies on constructing integral Fisher markets wherein specific equilibria are not only efficient, but
also fair.
1 Introduction
The theory of fair division addresses the fundamental problem of allocating goods or resources
among agents in a fair and efficient manner. Such problems arise in many real-world settings such as
government auctions, divorce settlements, and border disputes. Starting with the work of Steinhaus
(1948), there is now a vast literature in economics and mathematics to formally address fair division
(Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brandt et al., 2016; Moulin, 2004). Many interesting connections have also
been found between fair division and fields such as topology, measure theory, combinatorics, and
algorithms (Matousek, 2008).
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Much of the prior work in fair division, though, has focused on divisible goods, which model re-
sources that can be fractionally allocated (such as land). A standard fairness concept in this setting is
envy-freeness (Foley, 1967), which requires that each agent prefers its own allocation over that of any
other agent. A well-known result of Varian (1974) shows that for the divisible setting, there always
exists an allocation that is both envy-free (i.e., fair) and Pareto efficient. Furthermore, such an allo-
cation can be computed in polynomial time (Devanur et al., 2008; Eisenberg and Gale, 1959). These
results, however, do not extend to the setting of indivisible goods, which model discrete resources
such as courses at universities (Othman et al., 2010) or inherited artwork. In fact, many of the clas-
sical solution concepts and algorithms that have been developed for divisible goods are not directly
applicable to the indivisible setting. For example, an envy-free allocation fails to exist even in the
simple setting of a single indivisible good and two agents.
These considerations have motivated recent work in the theoretical computer science and eco-
nomics communities on developing relevant notions of fairness, along with existence results and al-
gorithms for the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016; Budish,
2011; Kurokawa et al., 2018; Lipton et al., 2004). We contribute to this line of work by showing that
guarantees analogous to the fundamental result of Varian (1974) hold even for indivisible goods in
terms of a natural and necessary relaxation of envy-freeness. Specifically, we show that for additive
valuations,1 a fair and efficient allocation always exists, and such an allocation can be computed in
(pseudo)-polynomial time.
We consider an allocation of indivisible goods to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1).
This notion was defined by Budish (2011), and provides a compelling relaxation of the envy-freeness
property.2 An allocation is said to be EF1 if each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any
other agent up to the removal of the most valuable good from the other agent’s bundle. Although the
existence of envy-free allocations is not guaranteed in the context of indivisible goods, an EF1 alloca-
tion always exists—even under general, combinatorial valuations—and can be found in polynomial
time (Lipton et al., 2004).
With this notion of fairness in hand, it is relevant to ask whether we can achieve efficiency along
with fairnesswhile allocating indivisible goods.3 This questionwas recently studied by Caragiannis et al.
(2016), who showed a striking result that there is no need to trade efficiency for fairness: For addi-
tive valuations, an allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare (Kaneko and Nakamura, 1979;
Nash Jr, 1950)—defined to be the geometric mean of the agents’ valuations—is both fair (EF1) and
Pareto efficient. However, maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW) over integral allocations is an
NP-hard problem (Nguyen et al., 2014). (In fact, the problem is known to be APX-hard (Lee, 2017)).
Therefore, this existence result does not automatically provide an efficient algorithm for finding a
fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods. Our work bypasses this limitation by providing a
pseudopolynomial time algorithm for finding an EF1 and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods un-
der additive valuations. In particular, when the valuations are bounded, our algorithm finds such an
allocation in polynomial time. It is worth pointing out that the problem of maximizing NSW remains
APX-hard even for bounded valuations (Lee, 2017).
1Additivitymeans that an agent’s valuation for a set of goods is the sum of its valuations for the individual goods in that
set.
2The notion of EF1 has found practical appeal on the popular fair division website “Spliddit” (Goldman and Procaccia,
2015) and in course allocation at Wharton School of Business (Budish et al., 2016).
3Note that fairness, by itself, does not guarantee efficiency; in fact, an EF1 allocation can be highly inefficient (Sec-
tion B.6).
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A related problem is that of developing approximation algorithms for NSW maximization. This
problem has received considerable attention in recent years (Anari et al., 2017, 2018; Bei et al., 2017;
Cole and Gkatzelis, 2015; Cole et al., 2017; Garg et al., 2018). The first constant-factor (specifically,
2.89) approximation for this problemwas provided by Cole and Gkatzelis (2015). This approximation
factor was subsequently improved to e (Anari et al., 2017), and most recently to 2 (Cole et al., 2017).
Similar approximation guarantees have also been developed for more general market models such
as piecewise-linear concave utilities (Anari et al., 2018), budget additive valuations (Garg et al., 2018),
and multi-unit markets (Bei et al., 2017).
While the problem of approximating NSW is interesting in its own right, it is relevant to note that
an allocation that approximates this objective is, in and of itself, not guaranteed to be EF1 or Pareto
efficient (see Section B.8 for an example).4 A second key contribution of our work is to show that our
algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation to the NSW maximization problem. Thus, not
only does our algorithm improve upon the best-known approximation ratio for this problem (namely,
the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al. (2017)), it is also guaranteed to return a fair and efficient
outcome. The following list summarizes our contributions.
Our contributions
• We develop an algorithm for computing an EF1 and Pareto efficient allocation for additive valu-
ations. The running time of our algorithm is pseudopolynomial for general integral valuations
(Theorem 1) and polynomial when the valuations are bounded (Remark 1). In addition, our
algorithm can find an approximate EF1 and approximate Pareto efficient allocation in polyno-
mial time even without the bounded valuations assumption (Remark 2).
• We establish a stronger existence result compared to Caragiannis et al. (2016): For additive valu-
ations, there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient (Theorem 2).
In other words, the problem of finding an EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient allocation is total.
An interesting complexity-theoretic implication of this result is that there exists a nondetermin-
istic polynomial time algorithm for finding an EF1 and Pareto efficient allocation (Remark 3).
This implication does not directly follow from the existence result of Caragiannis et al. (2016),
as the problem of verifying whether an arbitrary allocation is Pareto efficient is known to be
co-NP-complete (de Keijzer et al., 2009).
• We show that our algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation for the Nash so-
cial welfare (NSW) maximization problem (Theorem 3). This improves upon the best known
approximation factor for this problem (namely, the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al.
(2017)), and also matches the lower bound of e1/e ≈ 1.44 on the integrality gap of the convex
program of Cole et al. (2017). An interesting byproduct of our analysis is a novel connection
between envy-freeness and NSW: Under identical valuations, an EF1 allocation provides a
1.45-approximation to the maximum NSW (Lemma 1).
Our techniques It is known from the fundamental theorems of welfare economics that markets
tend toward efficiency. Intuitively, our results are based on establishing a complementary result that
markets can be fair as well. In particular, we construct a Fisher market along with an underlying
4We also provide an example (Section B.7) in which every rounding of the “spending restricted outcome”—a market
equilibrium notion used in the design of approximation algorithms for NSW (Anari et al., 2018; Cole and Gkatzelis, 2015;
Cole et al., 2017)—violates EF1.
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equilibrium which is integral (i.e., corresponding to an allocation of the indivisible goods) and EF1.
The fact that this allocation is a market equilibrium ensures, via the first welfare theorem, that it is
Pareto efficient as well.
More concretely, we start with a Pareto efficient allocation, and iteratively modify the allocation
by exchanging goods between the agents. The goal of the exchange step is to locally move toward a
fair allocation. Additionally, throughout these exchanges, we maintain a set of prices that ensure that
the current allocation corresponds to an equilibrium outcome for the existing market. We stop when
the equilibrium of the market (i.e., the allocation at hand) satisfies price envy-freeness up to one good
(refer to Section 4.1 for a formal definition). Essentially, this property ensures that under the given
market prices, the spending of an agent is at least that of any other agent up to the removal of the
highest priced good from the other agent’s bundle. Requiring the spendings to be balanced in this
manner implies the desired EF1 property for the corresponding fair division instance; see Section 4
for a detailed description of this construction.
At a conceptual level, our approach differs from the existing approaches in two important ways:
First, our algorithm works with an integral Fisher market at every step, thereby breaking away from
the standard relax-and-round paradigm where a fractional market equilibrium is first computed (typ-
ically as a solution of some convex program) followed by a rounding step (Anari et al., 2017, 2018;
Cole and Gkatzelis, 2015; Cole et al., 2017; Garg et al., 2018). Second, unlike all existing approaches,
our algorithm uses the notion of price envy-freeness up to one good as a measure of balanced spending
in the Fisher market. To the best of our knowledge, this notion is novel to this work, and might find
future use in the design of fair and efficient algorithms for other settings.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Fair Division Model
Problem instance An instance of the fair division problem is a tuple 〈[n], [m],V〉, where [n] =
{1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of n ∈ N agents, [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the set of m ∈ N goods, and
the valuation profile V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} specifies the preferences of each agent i ∈ [n] over the set of
goods [m] via a valuation function vi : 2
[m] → Z+ ∪ {0}. We will assume throughout that the valuation
functions are additive, i.e., for each agent i ∈ [n] and any set of goodsG ⊆ [m], vi(G) :=
∑
j∈G vi({j}).
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For simplicity, we will write vi,j instead of vi({j}) for a singleton good j ∈ [m]. Thus, vi,j is non-
negative and integral for each agent i ∈ [n] and each good j ∈ [m]. We will also assume, without loss
of generality, that for each good j ∈ [m], there exists some agent i ∈ [n] with a nonzero valuation for
it, i.e., vi,j > 0. Finally, we let vmax := maxi,j vi,j .
Allocation An allocation x ∈ {0, 1}n×m refers to an n-partition (x1, . . . ,xn) of [m], where xi ⊆ [m] is
the bundle allocated to agent i. We let X denote the set of all n partitions of [m]. Given an allocation
x, the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle xi is vi(xi) =
∑
j∈xi
vi,j .
Another useful notion is that of a fractional allocation. A fractional allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n×m refers to
a (possibly) fractional assignment of the goods to the agents such that no more than one unit of each
good is allocated, i.e., for all j ∈ [m], we have
∑
i∈[n] xi,j ≤ 1. We will use the term allocation to refer
to an integral allocation, and explicitly write fractional allocation otherwise.
5We will assume that vi({∅}) = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
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2.2 Fairness Notions
Envy-freeness and its variants Given an instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 and an allocation x, we say that an
agent i ∈ [n] envies another agent k ∈ [n] if i strictly prefers the bundle of k over its own bundle, i.e.,
vi(xk) > vi(xi). An allocation x is said to be envy-free (EF) if each agent prefers its own bundle over
that of any other agent, i.e., for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we have vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk).
An allocation x is said to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there
exists a good j ∈ xk such that vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk \ {j}). Given any ε > 0, an allocation x is said to be
ε-approximately envy-free up to one good (ε-EF1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good
j ∈ xk such that (1 + ε)vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk \ {j}).
Nash social welfare Given an allocation x, write NSW(x) :=
(∏
i∈[n] vi(xi)
) 1
n
to denote the Nash
social welfare of x. An allocation x∗ said to be Nash optimal if x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈X NSW(x).
2.3 Efficiency Notions
Pareto efficiency Given an instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 and an allocation x, we say that x is Pareto domi-
nated by another allocation y if vk(yk) ≥ vk(xk) for every agent k ∈ [n], and vi(yi) > vi(xi) for some
agent i ∈ [n]. An allocation is said to be Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal (PO) if it is not Pareto domi-
nated by any other allocation. Similarly, x is ε-Pareto efficient (ε-PO) if it is not ε-Pareto dominated by
any other allocation y, i.e., there does not exist an allocation y such that vk(yk) ≥ (1 + ε)vk(xk) for
every agent k ∈ [n] and vi(yi) > (1 + ε)vi(xi) for some agent i ∈ [n].
Some of our results use a generalization of Pareto efficiency, which we call fractional Pareto effi-
ciency. An allocation is said to be fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO) if it not Pareto dominated by any
fractional allocation. Thus, a fractionally Pareto efficient allocation is also Pareto efficient, but the
converse is not necessarily true (Section B.5 provides an example).
3 Main Results
This section provides the statements of our three main results: an algorithm for finding an EF1 and
PO allocation (Theorem 1), an existence result for EF1 and fPO allocation (Theorem 2), and an ap-
proximation algorithm for Nash social welfare (Theorem 3).
Algorithmic Result:
Theorem 1. Given any fair division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 with additive valuations, an allocation that is
envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto efficient (PO) can be found in O (poly(m,n, vmax)) time, where
vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
Remark 1. Note that when all valuations are polynomially bounded (i.e., there exists a polynomial
f(m,n) such that for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], vi,j ≤ f(m,n)), an EF1 and PO allocation can be
computed in polynomial time. In particular, this is true when all valuations are bounded by a constant.
As mentioned earlier in Section 1, the problem of maximizing NSW remains APX-hard even for
constant valuations (Lee, 2017), and therefore our result circumvents the intractability associated
with computing a Nash optimal allocation in order to achieve these two properties.
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Remark 2. If we relax the fairness and efficiency requirements in Theorem 1 to their approximate
analogues, then our algorithm is guaranteed to run in polynomial time. Specifically, our algorithm
can find an ε-EF1 and ε-PO allocation in O
(
poly(m,n, 1ε , ln vmax)
)
time, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
(Refer to Lemma 7 in Section 5.2).
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Section 5.
Existence Result:
Theorem 2. Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that
is envy-free up to one good (EF1) and fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO).
Remark 3. Consider the canonical binary relation REF1+PO associated with the problem of finding
an EF1 and PO allocation, defined as follows: For a fair division instance I and an allocation x,
the relation REF1+PO(I,x) holds if and only if x is an EF1 and PO allocation of I . It is relevant to
note that under standard complexity theoretic assumptions, REF1+PO is not in TFNP.6 By contrast,
the binary relation REF1+fPO(I,x), which holds if and only if x is an EF1 and fPO allocation for
the instance I , admits efficient verification.7 Since Theorem 2 shows that REF1+fPO is total, we get
that the binary relationREF1+fPO is in TFNP. Thus, there exists a nondeterministic polynomial time
algorithm for finding an EF1 and fPO (and hence EF1 and PO) allocation.
The proof of Theorem 2 is provided in Section 6.
Approximating Nash Social Welfare:
Theorem 3. For additive valuations, there exists a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation algorithm for the
Nash social welfare maximization problem.
Our proof of Theorem 3 draws on the following interesting connection between approximate
envy-freeness and Nash social welfare:
Lemma 1. Given a fair division instance with identical and additive valuations, any ε-EF1 allocation provides
a e(1+ε)/e-approximation to Nash social welfare.
The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in Section 7.
4 Our Algorithm
This section presents our algorithm. We start with the relevant preliminaries in Section 4.1 that pro-
vide the necessary definitions required for describing the algorithm. The pseudocode of the algo-
rithm appears in Section 4.2 along with a brief description.
6It is known that determining whether an arbitrary allocation is PO is co-NP-complete (de Keijzer et al., 2009). This fact
can be used to show that verifying whether a given allocation is EF1 and PO is also co-NP-complete. Hence, the binary
relationREF1+PO cannot be efficiently verified (i.e., it is not in FNP), unless P = NP.
7
EF1 can be checked by considering O(n2) inequalities, and fPO can be verified by a linear program (Section B.3).
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4.1 Market Terminology
Fisher market The Fisher market is a fundamental model in the economics of resource allocation
(Brainard and Scarf, 2000). It captures the settingwhere a set of buyers enter themarket with prespec-
ified budgets, and use it to buy goods that provide maximum utility per unit of money spent. Specif-
ically, a Fisher market consists of a set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n buyers, a set [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of m
divisible goods (exactly one unit of each good is available), and a valuation profile V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
Each buyer i ∈ [n] has an initial endowment (or budget) ei > 0. The endowment holds no intrinsic
value for a buyer and is only used for buying the goods. We call e = (e1, . . . , en) the endowment vector,
and denote a market instance by 〈[n], [m],V, e〉.
A market outcome is given by the pair 〈x,p〉, where the allocation vector x = (x1, . . . ,xn) is a frac-
tional allocation of the m goods, and the price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) associates a price pj ≥ 0
with each good j ∈ [m]. The spending of buyer i under the market outcome 〈x,p〉 is given by
p(xi) =
∑m
j=1 xi,jpj . The valuation derived by the buyer i under the market outcome 〈x,p〉 is given
by vi(xi) =
∑m
j=1 xi,jvi,j .
Given a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm), define the bang per buck ratio of buyer i for good j as αi,j :=
vi,j/pj , and its maximum bang per buck ratio as αi := maxj αi,j .
8 LetMBBi := {j ∈ [m] : vi,j/pj = αi}
denote the set of all goods that maximize the bang per buck ratio for buyer i at the price vector p. We
callMBBi the maximum bang per buck set (orMBB set) of buyer i at the price vector p.
An outcome 〈x,p〉 is said to be a Fisher market equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Market clearing: Each good is either priced at zero or is completely allocated. That is, for each
good j ∈ [m], either pj = 0 or
∑n
i=1 xi,j = 1.
• Budget exhaustion: Buyers spend their endowments completely, i.e., p(xi) = ei for all i ∈ [n].
• Maximum bang per buck allocation: Each buyer’s allocation is a subset of itsMBB set. That is, for
any buyer i ∈ [n] and any good j ∈ [m], xi,j > 0 =⇒ j ∈ MBBi. Stated differently, each buyer
only spends on its maximum bang per buck goods. Notice that a consequence of spending only
on MBB goods is that each buyer maximizes its utility at the given prices p under the budget
constaints.9
We refer the reader to Section B.2 for additional market preliminaries.
Proposition 1 (First Welfare Theorem; Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 16). For a Fisher market with
additive valuations, any equilibrium outcome is fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO).
Price envy-freeness and its variants Several of our results rely on constructing market outcomes
with a property called price envy-freeness—a notion we consider to be of independent interest. Specif-
ically, let x be an allocation and let p be a price vector for a given Fisher market. We say that x is
price envy-free (pEF) with respect to p if for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], we have p(xi) ≥ p(xk).
10
Similarly, x is said to be price envy-free up to one good (pEF1) with respect to p if for every pair of
buyers i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ xk such that p(xi) ≥ p (xk \ {j}). Finally, given any ε > 0,
we say that an allocation x is ε-approximately price envy-free up to one good (ε-pEF1) with respect to p if
for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ xk such that (1 + ε)p(xi) ≥ p(xk \ {j}).
8If vi,j = 0 and pj = 0, then we define αi,j = 0.
9One might expect utility maximization condition to be equivalent to the MBB allocation condition. Section B.4 shows
that this is not the case; indeed,MBB allocation is a strictly stronger requirement.
10Equivalently, for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], we require p(xi) = p(xk).
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MBB graph and alternating paths TheMBB graph of a Fisher market instance with a price vector p
is defined as a bipartite graphGwhose vertex set consists of the set of agents [n] and the set of goods
[m], and there is an edge between an agent i ∈ [n] and a good j ∈ [m] if j ∈ MBBi (called an MBB
edge). Given an allocation x, we can augment theMBB graph by adding allocation edges, i.e., an edge
between an agent i ∈ [n] and a good j ∈ [m] such that j ∈ xi. For an augmented MBB graph, we
define an alternating path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, jℓ, k) from agent i to agent k (and involving the
agents i1, i2, . . . , iℓ−1 and the goods j1, j2, . . . , jℓ) as a series of alternatingMBB and allocation edges
such that j1 ∈ MBBi ∩ xi1 , j2 ∈MBBi1 ∩ xi2 ,. . . , jℓ ∈ MBBiℓ−1 ∩ xk. If such a path exists, we say that
the agent k is reachable from agent i via an alternating path. Notice that no agent or good is allowed
to repeat in an alternating path. We say that the path P is of length 2ℓ since it consists of ℓMBB edges
and ℓ allocation edges.
Hierarchy structure LetG denote the augmentedMBB graph for a Fisher market instance with the
market outcome (x,p). Fix a source agent i ∈ [n] in G. Define the level of an agent k ∈ [n] as half
the length of the shortest alternating path from i to k (if one exists). The level of the source agent i is
defined to be zero. If there is no alternating path from i to some agent k in G (i.e., if k is not reachable
from i), then the level of k is set to be n. The hierarchy structureHi of agent i is defined as a level-wise
collection of all agents that are reachable from i, i.e., Hi = {H
0
i ,H
1
i ,H
2
i , . . . , }, where H
ℓ
i denotes the
set of agents that are at level ℓ with respect to the agent i. Section A.1 provides a polynomial time
subroutine called BuildHierarchy for constructing the hierarchy.
Given a hierarchy Hi, we will overload the term alternating path to refer to a series of alternating
MBB and allocation edges connecting agents at a lower level to those at a higher level. That is, a path
P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, jℓ, k) involving agents from the hierarchy Hi is said to be an alternating
path if (1) j1 ∈ MBBi ∩ xi1 , j2 ∈ MBBi1 ∩ xi2 ,. . . , jℓ ∈ MBBiℓ−1 ∩ xk, and (2) level(i) < level(i1) <
level(i2) < · · · < level(iℓ−1) < level(k). In particular, an alternating path in a hierarchy cannot have
edges between agents at the same level.
Violators and path-violators Given a Fisher market instance and a market outcome (x,p), an
agent i ∈ [n] with the smallest spending among all the agents is called the least spender, i.e., i ∈
argmink∈[n] p(xk) (ties are broken according to a prespecified ordering over the agents). An agent
k ∈ [n] is said to be a violator if for every good j ∈ xk, we have that p(xk \ {j}) > p(xi), where i is the
least spender. Similarly, agent k ∈ [n] is said to be an ε-violator if for every good j ∈ xk, we have that
p(xk \ {j}) > (1 + ε)p(xi). Notice that an agent can be a violator without being an ε-violator. Also
notice that if no agent is a violator (ε-violator), then the allocation x is pEF1 (ε-pEF1) with respect to
p.
A closely related notion is that of a path-violator. Let i denote the least spender, and let Hi denote
the hierarchy of agent i. An agent k ∈ Hi is said to be a path-violator with respect to the alternating
path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, jℓ, k) if p(xk \ {jℓ}) > p(xi). Observe that a path-violator (along
a path P ) need not be a violator, since there can be a good j ∈ xk not on the path P such that
p(xk \ {j}) ≤ p(xi). Similarly, an agent k ∈ Hi is said to be an ε-path-violator with respect to the
alternating path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, jℓ, k) if p(xk \ {jℓ}) > (1 + ε)p(xi).
4.2 Description of the Algorithm
Given any fair division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 as input and a parameter ε > 0, our algorithm
(Algorithm 1), referred to as Alg from here onwards, constructs a market equilibrium (x,p) with
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respect to a Fisher market instance 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 (for a suitable endowment vector e). The pair (x,p)
has the following two properties: (1) x is an integral allocation, and (2) x is 3ε-pEF1with respect to p.
The second property allows us to show that the allocation x is 3ε-EF1 for the corresponding fair divi-
sion instance I (see Lemma 2 below). Furthermore, by the first welfare theorem (Proposition 1), the
allocation x is also guaranteed to be fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO) for the Fisher market instance,
and consequently for the fair division instance I .
Lemma 2. Let ε ≥ 0, and let x and p be an allocation and a price vector respectively for a market instance
〈[n], [m],V, e〉 such that (1) x is ε-approximately price-envy-free up to one good (ε-pEF1), and (2) xi ⊆ MBBi
for each buyer i ∈ [n]. Then, x is ε-approximately envy-free up to one good (ε-EF1) for the associated fair
division instance 〈[n], [m],V〉.
Proof. Since x is ε-pEF1with respect to the price vector p, for any pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], there exists
a good j ∈ xk such that (1 + ε)p(xi) ≥ p (xk \ {j}). Multiplying both sides by the maximum bang
per buck ratio αi of agent i, we get
αi · (1 + ε)p(xi) ≥ αi · p (xk \ {j})
=⇒ (1 + ε)vi(xi) ≥ αi · p (xk \ {j}) (since xi ⊆ MBBi)
=⇒ (1 + ε)vi(xi) ≥ vi (xk \ {j}) ,
which is the ε-EF1 guarantee for the allocation x.
In order to construct the desired Fisher market equilibrium, our algorithm starts with a welfare-
maximizing allocation x and a price vector p such that x is fPO and each agent gets a subset of
its MBB goods (this is Phase 1 of Alg). If the allocation x is 3ε-pEF1 with respect to p, then the
algorithm terminates with the output (x,p). Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds to the next phase.
In Phase 2, the algorithm works with the hierarchy of the least spending agent, and performs a
series of exchanges (or swaps) of goods between the agents in the hierarchy (without changing the
prices). The swaps are aimed at ensuring that at the end of Phase 2, no agent in the hierarchy is
ε-pEF1 envied by the least spender. Furthermore, all exchanges in Phase 2 happen only along the
MBB edges, thus maintaining at each stage the condition that x is an equilibrium allocation, and
hence, fPO.
If, at the end of Phase 2, the current allocation x is still not 3ε-pEF1with respect to the price vector
p, the algorithm moves to Phase 3. This phase consists of uniformly raising the prices of the goods
owned by the members of the hierarchy. The prices are raised until either the allocation x becomes
3ε-pEF1 with respect to the new price vector p, or a new agent gets added to the hierarchy. In the
latter case, the algorithm goes back to the start of Phase 2.
It is relevant to note that establishing the time complexity of this algorithm is an intricate task; a
priori, it is not even clear whether the algorithm terminates. The stated running time bound is in fact
obtained via a number of involved arguments which, in particular, rely on analyzing the spending of
the agents in different phases.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
This section presents the analysis of our algorithm and a proof of Theorem 1. Section 5.1 presents the
analysis of our algorithm for valuations that satisfy the power-of-(1+ε) property. Section 5.2 extends
this analysis to general valuations, culminating in the proof of Theorem 1.
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ALGORITHM 1: Alg
Input: An instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 such that valuations are power-of–(1 + ε).
Output: An integral allocation x and a price vector p.
// Phase 1: Initialization
1 x←Welfare-maximizing allocation (allocate each good j to the agent i ∈ argmaxk∈[n] vk,j)
2 p← For each good j ∈ [m], set pj = vi,j if j ∈ xi.
3 if (x,p) is 3ε-pEF1 then return (x,p)
// Phase 2: Removing price-envy within hierarchy
4 i← least spender under (x,p) /* break ties lexicographically */
5 Hi ← BuildHierarchy(i,x,p)
6 ℓ← 1
7 whileHℓi is non-empty and (x,p) is not 3ε-pEF1 do
8 if h ∈ Hℓi is an ε-path-violator along the alternating path P = {i, j1, h1, . . . , jℓ−1, hℓ−1, j, h} then
9 xh ← xh \ {j} and xhℓ−1 ← xhℓ−1 ∪ {j} /* Swap operation */
10 Repeat Phase 2 starting from Line 4
11 else
12 ℓ← ℓ+ 1
13 if (x,p) is 3ε-pEF1 then
14 return (x,p)
15 else
16 Move to Phase 3 starting from Line 17
// -Phase 3: Price-rise-
17 α1 ← min
h∈Hi, j∈[m]\xHi
αh
vh,j/pj
, where αh is the maximum bang per buck ratio for agent h, and xHi is the set of
goods currently owned by members of the hierarchyHi
/* α1 corresponds to raising prices until a new agent gets added to the hierarchy */
18 α2 ←
1
p(xi)
max
k∈[n]\Hi
min
j∈xk
p(xk \ {j})
/* α2 corresponds to raising prices until the pEF1 condition is satisfied */
19 α3 ← (1 + ε)
s, where s is the smallest integral power of (1 + ε) such that (1 + ε)s > p(xh)
p(xi)
; here i is the least
spender and h ∈ argmink∈[n]\Hi p(xk).
/* α3 corresponds to raising prices in multiples of (1 + ε) until the identity of the least
spender changes */
20 α← min(α1, α2, α3)
21 foreach good j ∈ xHi do
22 pj ← α · pj
23 if α = α2 then
24 return (x,p)
25 else
26 Repeat Phase 2 starting from Line 4
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5.1 Analysis of Algwhen the Valuations are power-of-(1 + ε)
In this section, we will analyze Alg under the assumption that all valuations are power-of-(1+ ε), i.e.,
there exists ε > 0 such that for each agent i ∈ [n] and each good j ∈ [m], we have vi,j ∈ {0, (1 + ε)
a}
for some natural number a (possibly depending on i and j). We will start by defining the notion of a
time step that will be useful in the subsequent analysis.
Time steps and events The execution ofAlg can be described in terms of the following four events:
(1) Swap operation in Phase 2, (2) Change in the identity of least spender in Phase 2, (3) Price-rise by a
factor of α in Phase 3, and (4) Termination step. We use the term time step (or simply a step) to denote
the indexing of any execution of Alg, e.g., Alg might perform a swap operation on the first and
second time steps, followed by a price-rise in the third time step, and so on. We will use the phrase
“at time step t” to denote the state of the algorithm before the event at time step t takes place. Notice
that each event stated above runs in polynomial time, and therefore it suffices to analyze the running
time of Alg in terms of the total number of events (or time steps).
We will now proceed to analyzing the correctness (Lemma 3) and the running time (Lemma 4) of
Alg for power-of-(1 + ε) valuations.
Lemma 3 (Correctness ofAlg for power-of–(1 + ε) instance). Given any power-of-(1 + ε) instance as
input, the allocation returned by Alg is 3ε-approximately envy-free up to one good (3ε-EF1) and fractionally
Pareto efficient (fPO).
Proof. Let the output of Alg be (x,p). The fact that x is fPO follows from the observation that at
each step of the algorithm, the allocation of any agent is a subset of itsMBB goods, i.e., at each time
step, we have xi ⊆ MBBi for each agent i ∈ [n]. This is certainly true at the end of Phase 1 by way of
setting the prices. In Phase 2, each swap operation only happens along an alternatingMBB-allocation
edge, which maintains the MBB condition. Phase 3 involves raising the prices of the goods owned
by the members of the hierarchy Hi without changing the allocation. We will argue that for each
agent k ∈ [n], if xk ⊆ MBBk before the price-rise, then the same continues to hold after the price-rise.
Indeed, for any agent k /∈ Hi, we have xk ∩xHi = ∅. As a result, raising the prices of the goods in xHi
does not affect the bang per buck ratio of agent k for the goods in xk (and can only reduce its bang
per buck ratio for the goods in xHi), thus maintaining the above condition. For any agent k ∈ Hi, we
have MBBk ⊆ xHi by construction of the hierarchy. Raising the prices of the goods in xHi therefore
corresponds to lowering theMBB ratios for the agents in Hi. By choice of α1, the price-rise stops as
soon as a newMBB-edge appears between an agent k ∈ Hi and a good j /∈ xHi . This ensures that the
new maximum bang per buck ratio for any agent k ∈ Hi does not fall below its second highest bang
per buck ratio prior to the price-rise, thus guaranteeing xk ⊆ MBBk.
We can now define a Fisher market where each agent’s endowment equals its spending under x.
Since (x,p) is an equilibrium for this market, we have that x is fPO (Proposition 1).
Next, wewill argue that x is 3ε-EF1. Notice thatAlg terminates only if either the current outcome
(x,p) is 3ε-pEF1, or when α = α2 (Line 23). In the first case, we get that x is 3ε-EF1 for the underlying
fair division instance (Lemma 2). Therefore, we only need to analyze the second case.
Let us suppose that the termination happens at time step t, and let q be the price vector main-
tained by Alg just before the price-rise step that lead to termination. After the time step t, Alg
terminates with the allocation x and price vector p. Since Phase 3 does not change the ownership of
the goods, the allocation maintained by Alg just before termination is also x.
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Let i be the least spender at time step t, and let Hi be the hierarchy of agent i. Since Phase 3
only affects the prices of the goods in xHi , we have that p(xk) = q(xk) for all k ∈ [n] \ Hi, and
p(xk) = α2q(xk) for all k ∈ Hi. Additionally, at the end of (any execution of) Phase 2, no agent in the
least spender’s hierarchy is an ε-path-violator (and hence is also not an ε-violator). Thus,
(1 + ε)q(xi) ≥ max
k∈Hi
min
j∈xk
q(xk \ {j})
=⇒ (1 + ε)p(xi) ≥ max
k∈Hi
min
j∈xk
p(xk \ {j}). (1)
By definition of α2, we have the following condition for the agents outside the hierarchy:
p(xi) = α2q(xi) ≥ max
k∈[n]\Hi
min
j∈xk
q(xk \ {j}) = max
k∈[n]\Hi
min
j∈xk
p(xk \ {j}). (2)
Equations (1) and (2) together imply that
(1 + ε)p(xi) ≥ max
k∈[n]
min
j∈xk
p(xk \ {j}), (3)
which means that the outcome (x,p) is ε-pEF1 for agent i. If agent i is a least spender under (x,p)
(i.e., i continues to a least spender after the price rise), then x is ε-pEF1 with respect to p, and the
lemma follows. Otherwise, an agent h ∈ argmink∈[n]\Hi q(xk) must become the least spender after
the final price-rise step. In this case, we have that
(1 + ε)q(xh) ≥ α3q(xi) (by definition of α3)
=⇒ (1 + ε)q(xh) ≥ α2q(xi) (α = α2 =⇒ α2 ≤ α3)
=⇒ (1 + ε)p(xh) ≥ p(xi) (since p(xi) = α2q(xi) and p(xh) = q(xh))
=⇒ (1 + ε)2p(xh) ≥ min
j∈xk
p(xk \ {j}) for all k ∈ [n],
where the last inequality follows from Equation (3). Since 0 < ε < 1, we have that (1 + ε)2 < 1 + 3ε.
Thus, the new least spender (agent h) satisfies (1+3ε)p(xh) ≥ minj∈xk p(xk \{j}) for all k ∈ [n]. This
implies that (x,p) is 3ε-pEF1. The stated claim now follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 (Running time bound for power-of–(1 + ε) instance). Given any power-of-(1 + ε) instance
as input, Alg terminates in time O
(
poly(m,n, 1ε , ln vmax)
)
, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
The proof of Lemma 4 appears in Section A.2.
5.2 Analysis of Alg for General Valuations: Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we will show that for any given fair division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 with integral
valuations, an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto efficient (PO) can be found
in pseudopolynomial time (Theorem 1). In particular, for bounded valuations, this result provides a
polynomial time algorithm for computing an EF1 and PO allocation (Remark 1).
We will prove Theorem 1 by running Alg on a ε-rounded version I ′ = 〈[n], [m],V ′〉 of the given
instance I for some parameter ε > 0. The instance I ′ is a power-of-(1 + ε) instance11 constructed
by rounding up the valuations in I to the nearest integer power of (1 + ε). From Lemma 3, we know
11Recall that in a power-of-(1 + ε) instance, we have vi,j ∈ {0, (1 + ε)
a} for some a ∈ N (possibly depending on i and j).
12
that the allocation returned by Alg is 3ε-EF1 and fPO with respect to I ′ (for any given ε > 0). We
will show that for an appropriate choice of ε, the same allocation turns out to be EF1 and PO with
respect to the original instance I . In addition, the running time bound in Lemma 4 instantiated for
this choice of εwill show that Alg runs in pseudopolynomial time.
More formally, the ε-rounded version I ′ = 〈[n], [m],V ′〉 of the given instance I is constructed as
follows: For each agent i ∈ [n] and each good j ∈ [m], the valuation v′i,j is given by
v′i,j :=
{
(1 + ε)⌈log1+ε vi,j⌉ if vi,j > 0,
0 if vi,j = 0.
Notice that vi,j ≤ v
′
i,j ≤ (1 + ε)vi,j for each agent i and each good j.
Lemma 5 establishes that for an appropriate choice of ε, an allocation that is fPO for the ε-rounded
instance I ′ is POwith respect to the original instance I . The proof of Lemma 5 appears in Section A.3.
Lemma 5. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be a fair division instance, and let ε ≤ 1
6m3v4max
. Then, an allocation x that is
fPO for I ′ (the ε-rounded version of I) is PO for the original instance I .
Lemma 6 establishes that for a small enough δ, a δ-EF1 allocation is in fact EF1.
Lemma 6. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be a fair division instance, and let 0 < δ ≤ 12mvmax . Then, an allocation x is
δ-EF1 for I if and only if it is EF1 for I .
Proof. If x is δ-EF1, we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ xk such
that (1 + δ)vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk \ {j}). The bound on δ implies that vi(xk \ {j}) − vi(xi) ≤
1
2 . Integrality of
valuations gives vi(xk \ {j}) − vi(xi) ≤ 0, as desired.
Theorem 1. Given any fair division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 with additive valuations, an allocation that is
envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto efficient (PO) can be found in O (poly(m,n, vmax)) time, where
vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
Proof. Let I ′ = 〈[n], [m],V ′〉 be the ε-rounded version of I with ε = 1
14m3v4max
. From Lemmas 3 and 4,
we know that an allocation x that is 3ε-EF1 and fPO for I ′ can be found in O
(
poly(m,n, 1ε , ln vmax)
)
time. Under the stated choice of ε, Lemma 5 implies that x must be Pareto efficient (PO) for I .
Therefore, we only need to show that x is EF1 for the instance I .
Since x is 3ε-EF1 for I ′, we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ xk
such that (1 + 3ε)v′i(xi) ≥ v
′
i(xk \ {j}). Furthermore, since I
′ is a ε-rounded version of I , we have
that v′i,j ≤ (1 + ε)vi,j for each good j ∈ [m]. Hence, (1 + ε)(1 + 3ε)vi(xi) ≥ v
′
i(xk \ {j}). Finally,
since the valuations in I ′ are a rounded-up version of those in I , we have that vi,j ≤ v
′
i,j for each
good j ∈ [m], and thus (1 + ε)(1 + 3ε)vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk \ {j}). For ε ≤ 1, this expression simplifies to
(1 + 7ε)vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk \ {j}), which means that x is 7ε-EF1 for the instance I . Instantiating Lemma 6
for δ = 7ε gives that x is EF1 for I .
Lemma 7. Given the ε-rounded version I ′ (of the instance I) as input, Alg finds a 7ε-EF1 and ε-PO
allocation for I in O(poly(m,n, 1ε , ln vmax)) time.
Proof. Let x be the allocation returned byAlg. From Lemma 3, we know that x is 3ε-EF1 and fPO for
the ε-rounded instance I ′. By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, this implies
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that x is 7ε-EF1 for the original instance I . The running time guarantee follows from Lemma 4.
Hence, we only need to show that x is ε-PO.
Suppose, for contradiction, that x is ε-Pareto dominated by an allocation y. Thus, vk(yk) ≥ (1 +
ε)vk(xk) for every agent k ∈ [n] and vi(yi) > (1 + ε)vi(xi) for some agent i ∈ [n]. By construction of
the ε-rounded instance I ′, we know that vk,j ≤ v
′
k,j ≤ (1 + ε)vk,j for each agent k and each good j.
Using the inequality v′k,j ≤ (1 + ε)vk,j in a good-by-good manner for the bundle xk, along with the
additivity assumption of valuations in the instance I , we get that (1+ ε)vk(xk) ≥ v
′
k(xk). By a similar
application of the inequality vk,j ≤ v
′
k,j for the bundle yk, we get v
′
k(yk) ≥ vk(yk). Combining these
relations gives v′k(yk) ≥ v
′
k(xk) for every agent k ∈ [n] and v
′
i(yi) > v
′
i(xi) for some agent i ∈ [n].
However, this means that the allocation y Pareto dominates the allocation x in the instance I ′, which
is a contradiction since x is fPO for I ′.
6 Existence Result: Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that
is envy-free up to one good (EF1) and fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO).
Proof. Given any fair division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, define εz :=
1
14zm3v4max
for any natural number
z ∈ N. Write Iz = 〈[n], [m],Vz〉 to denote the εz-rounded version of I , with V
z = {vz1 , v
z
2 , . . . , v
z
n}
being the set of rounded valuations. By instantiating Lemma 3 with ε = εz , we can ensure that each
rounded version Iz admits an allocation xz which is εz-EF1 and fPO.
Note that for all z ≥ 1, allocation xz is an EF1 allocation for the instance I . This follows from the
analysis of Theorem 1, wherein we showed that if an allocation x is εz-EF1 with respect to I
z (the
εz-rounded version of I), then x is EF1 for I , as long as εz ≤
1
14m3v4max
.
To complete the proof, we will show that in the sequence of EF1 allocations (xz)z∈N, there
exists one which is also fPO for I . In particular, by applying the second welfare theorem of
Fisher markets (Theorem 4 in Section B.3), we get that for every z, there exists a price vector pz
such that xz satisfies the MBB condition with respect to pz and the valuations in Iz. That is,
xzi ⊆ MBB
z
i :=
{
j ∈ [m] :
vzi (j)
p
z
j
= αzi
}
for each agent i ∈ [n]; here, αzi is the maximum bang per
buck ratio of agent iwith respect to the price vector pz , i.e., αzi := maxj
vzi (j)
pj
.
Observe that if the outcome (xz ,Iz,pz) satisfies theMBB condition, then so does (xz ,Iz, c · pz),
for any positive c. In particular, by scaling pz by a factor of c = 1maxj∈[m] pzj
, we ensure that the price
vector c · pz lies in [0, 1]m for all z. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will assume that pz is
bounded for all z. In addition, since there are only finitely many integral allocations of [m], there
exists an infinite sequence z1, z2, . . . such that x
za = xzb for all a, b ∈ N. Let x denote the allocation
xza , i.e., x := xza for all a ∈ N. We know from the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem that there exists a
subsequence of (pz1 ,pz2 , . . .) and a price vector p∗ such that the subsequence converges to p∗, i.e.,
lima→∞ p
zqa = p∗. Let this subsequence be (pzq1 ,pzq2 , . . . ).
Overall, by a relabeling of the indices, we can guarantee the existence of a sequence of natural
numbers (z1, z2, . . .) such that x
za = x for all a ∈ N and lima→∞ p
za = p∗. In particular, we have that
x is an fPO allocation for each instance in the sequence Iz1 ,Iz2 , . . ., and hence it satisfies the MBB
condition in these instances as well.
Since Iza is an εza-rounded version of I , for any agent i ∈ [n] and good j ∈ [m], we have that
vi,j ≤ v
za
i,j ≤ (1 + εza)vi,j . Hence, from the sandwich theorem, we get that v
za
i,j converges to vi,j as a
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tends to infinity, i.e., lima→∞ v
za
i,j = vi,j .
Using the fact that x satisfies the MBB condition with respect to (pza ,Iza), we will show that it
satisfies theMBB condition for (p∗,I) as well. Specifically, consider any agent i ∈ [n] along with any
pair of goods j ∈ [m] and j′ ∈ xi such that v
za
i,j is nonzero, and hence vi,j is nonzero.
12 Now, theMBB
condition in Iza implies that
pzaj′
vzai,j′
≤
pzaj
vzai,j
.
Under the limit of a approaching infinity, we get
lim
a→∞
pzaj′
vzai,j′
≤ lim
a→∞
pzaj
vzai,j
=⇒
p∗j′
vi,j′
≤
p∗j
vi,j
.
Therefore, the allocation x satisfies theMBB condition with respect to the price vector p∗ and the
fair division instance I . Hence, using the first welfare theorem (Proposition 1), we get that x is fPO
for I . This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
7 Nash Social Welfare Approximation: Proof of Theorem 3
This section proves that Alg provides a 1.45 (≈ e1/e)-approximation for the Nash social welfare
maximization problem in polynomial time. We begin by showing (in Lemma 1) that if the valuations
of all the agents are identical, then any ε-EF1 allocation provides a e(1+ε)/e-approximation to Nash
social welfare. Wewill then use this result, along with an appropriate choice of ε, to prove the desired
approximation bound in Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. Given a fair division instance with identical and additive valuations, any ε-EF1 allocation provides
a e(1+ε)/e-approximation to Nash social welfare.
The proof of Lemma 1 makes use a structural result stated as Lemma 8. A relevant notion used
in these results is that of partially-fractional allocations, defined as follows: Given a subset B ⊂ [m]
of the set of goods, a partially-fractional allocation (with respect to B) is one where the goods in
B have to be integrally allocated and the remaining goods in [m] \ B can be fractionally allocated.
Formally, a partially-fractional allocation y ∈ [0, 1]n×m is such that for each agent i ∈ [n], we have
yi,j ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ B, and yi,j ∈ [0, 1] for each j ∈ [m] \B. We write FB to denote the set of all
partially-fractional allocations with respect to B.
Lemma 8. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be an instance with additive and identical valuation functions (denoted by
v for each agent) such that m ≥ n. Let B ⊂ [m] be a subset of goods such that |B| < n. Then, there is a
partially-fractional allocation ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ FB that maximizes Nash social welfare (among allocations
in FB) such that
(1) Each agent gets at most one good from B under ω. That is, for each agent i ∈ [n], we have that
|{j ∈ [m] : ωi,j > 0} ∩B| ≤ 1.
12Since Iza is a εza -rounded version of I, vi,jza is zero if and only if vi,j is zero.
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(2) Any agent with strictly-better-than-the-worst allocation under ω gets exactly one integral good (and no
fractional good). That is, for any agent i ∈ [n] such that v(ωi) > mink v(ωk), we have ωi,j = 1 for some
j ∈ B, and ωi,j′ = 0 for all j
′ 6= j.
Proof. (of Lemma 8) We will consider a partially-fractional allocation ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn) ∈ FB that
maximizes the Nash social welfare overFB , and show that it can be transformed (without decreasing
NSW) into an allocation in FB that satisfies the stated properties.
Observe that if an agent i ∈ [n] receives a fractional good under ω (i.e., ωi,j′ > 0 for some j
′ /∈ B),
then its value v(ωi) is equal to µ := mink v(ωk). This is because if v(ωi) > µ, thenwe can “redistribute”
j′ between agent i and the least valued agent argmink v(ωk) to obtain another fractional allocation in
FB with Nash social welfare strictly greater than that of ω. This contradicts the optimality of ω.
Therefore, any agent with value strictly greater than µ can only receive integral goods. We will
show that any such agent necessarily receives exactly one integral good, and hence establish property
(2). Suppose, for contradiction, that some agent i ∈ [n] receives distinct goods a, b ∈ B (i.e., ωi,a =
ωi,b = 1), and v(ωi) > µ. Since |B| < n, there exists some agent k ∈ [n] that does not receive
any integral good from B. Since agent k only receives fractional goods under ω, it follows from
the above argument that v(ωk) = µ. We can now assign one of the integral goods (say a) to agent
k, and redistribute the fractional goods in ωk between the agents i and k to obtain a new partially-
fractional allocation with strictly greater Nash social welfare than ω. This contradicts the optimality
of ω. Therefore, any agent with value strictly greater than µ must receive exactly one integral good
under ω.
Next we address property (1). Note that this property already holds for agents with value strictly
greater than µ. Hence, we only need to consider agents whose value is exactly equal to µ. Let i ∈ [n]
be an agent that receives two distinct goods a, b ∈ B such that v(ωi) = µ. Since |B| < n, there must
exist an agent k ∈ [n] that only receives fractional goods under ω. We can now perform a “swap” by
assigning one of the integral goods (say a) to agent k, and fractional goods of total value v(a) in ωk to
agent i to obtain a new partially-fractional allocation in FB with the same Nash social welfare as ω.
Such a swap is always possible, since v(a) ≤ v(ωi) = µ = v(ωk). By repeating this process at most n
times, we can obtain an NSWmaximizer satisfying property (1).
We will now prove Lemma 1.
Proof. (of Lemma 1) Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 denote the given instance with identical and additive valua-
tions, and let v denote the valuation function of all the agents. Write x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) to denote an
ε-EF1 allocation of I . Let ℓ denote the value of the least valued bundle in x, i.e., ℓ := mini∈[n] v(xi).
By reindexing, we have that v(x1) ≥ v(x2) ≥ . . . ≥ v(xn) = ℓ.
Wewill use gi to denote a largest valued good in the bundle xi of agent i, i.e., gi ∈ argmaxg∈xi v(g).
The fact that x is an ε-EF1 allocation implies that
v(xi \ {gi}) ≤ (1 + ε)ℓ for all i ∈ [n]. (4)
Define B := {g1, g2, . . . , gn−1}. Let ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ FB be a partially-fractional allocation (with
respect to B) that maximizes Nash social welfare among all allocations in FB . Since FB contains
all the integral allocations, we have NSW(ω) ≥ NSW(x∗), where x∗ is a Nash optimal (integral)
allocation. Hence, to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that NSW(x) ≥ 1
e(1+ε)/e
NSW(ω).
Define α := mink∈[n] v(ωk)/ℓ, and letH := {k ∈ [n] : v(xk) > αℓ}. Wewill now consider partially-
fractional allocations wherein only (and all) the goods in xH have to be allocated integrally, and the
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remaining goods can be fractionally allocated. Write FxH to denote the set of all such partially-
fractional allocations.
The rest of the proof consists of four parts: First, wewill construct an allocation x′ ∈ FxH such that
NSW(x′) ≤ NSW(x). (Doing this will allow us to work with the ratio NSW(x
′)
NSW(ω) , which is convenient
to bound from below.) Second, we will derive a lower bound on NSW(x′) in terms of the relevant
parameters α, ℓ, and n (and two other parameters h and t that we will define shortly). Third, we
will derive an upper bound on NSW(ω) in terms of the same parameters. Finally, we will derive
relationships between these parameters in order to achieve the stated approximation ratio.
• Constructing the allocation x′: We start by initializing x′ ← x. While there exist two agents i, k ∈
[n] such that ℓ < v(x′i) < v(x
′
k) < αℓ, we transfer goods of value∆ := min{v(x
′
i)− ℓ, αℓ− v(x
′
k)}
from x′i (the lesser valued bundle) to x
′
k (the larger valued bundle). In particular, this transfer of
goods ensures that the Nash social welfare does not increase. Also, this process must terminate
because after every iteration of the while-loop, either v(x′i) = ℓ or v(x
′
k) = αℓ, and therefore at
least one of these agents does not participate in future iterations of the while-loop. Moreover,
we have x′k = xk for all k ∈ H , as the agents inH do not participate in the transfer. This proves
that x′ ∈ FxH .
• Lower bound for NSW(x′): Notice that there can be at most one agent s in the allocation x′ such
that v(x′s) ∈ (ℓ, αℓ). This is because the while-loop continues to execute if there are two or more
such agents. For every other agent k ∈ [n] \H , v(x′k) is either ℓ or αℓ.
Let h := |{k ∈ [n] : v(xk) > αℓ}| denote the cardinality of the set H (i.e., h = |H|). Let
t := |{k ∈ [n] : v(x′k) ≥ αℓ}| denote the number of agents with a valuation at least αℓ in the
allocation x′. Thus, there are (n − t) agents with valuation strictly below αℓ in x′. We lower
bound the valuations of these agents by ℓ in order to obtain the following relation:
NSW(x′) ≥
(
h∏
i=1
v(xi)× (αℓ)
(t−h) × ℓ(n−t)
)1/n
. (5)
• Upper bound for NSW(ω): Recall that ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ FB is a partially-fractional allocation
(with respect to B) that maximizes Nash social welfare, and |B| < n. Using Lemma 8, we
can assume, without loss of generality, that ω has the following two properties: (1) each agent
i ∈ [n− 1] gets the good gi under ω (this can be ensured via reindexing since the valuations are
identical), and (2) if v(ωi) > mink∈[n] v(ωk) for any i ∈ [n], then agent i gets exactly one integral
good under ω (and no fractional good).
We will now argue that v(ωk) ≤ v(xk) for all k ∈ H . Suppose, for contradiction, that there
exists an agent k ∈ H such that v(ωk) > v(xk). By definition of H , v(xk) > αℓ for all k ∈ H ,
and therefore v(ωk) > αℓ. We also know that mink∈[n] v(ωk) = αℓ, and therefore, by property
(2), agent k must get exactly one integral good gk under ω (and no fractional good). However,
since gk ⊆ xk, this contradicts the condition v(ωk) > v(xk).
By a similar reasoning, we can show that v(ωk) = αℓ for all k ∈ [n] \H . Indeed, if v(ωk) > αℓ =
mina v(ωa) for some k ∈ [n]\H , then by property (2), agent kmust get exactly one integral good
gk under ω (and no fractional good). This would imply that v(xk) ≥ v(gk) = v(ωk) > αℓ, which
contradicts the fact that k ∈ [n] \H .
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These observations imply the following upper bound on the Nash social welfare of ω:
NSW(ω) ≤
(
h∏
i=1
v(xi)× (αℓ)
(n−h)
)1/n
. (6)
• Deriving relationship between the parameters: From Equation (4) and from the fact that x′k = xk for
all k ∈ H , we have v(x′k \ {gk}) = v(xk \ {gk}) ≤ (1 + ε)ℓ for all k ∈ H . Hence, we can upper
bound the value of all goods in [m] excluding the h goods in the set
⋃
k∈H{gk}, as follows:∑
i∈H
v(x′i \ {gi}) +
∑
i∈[n]\H
v(x′i) ≤ (1 + ε)hℓ+ αℓ(t− h+ 1) + ℓ(n− t− 1). (7)
Next, we will derive a lower bound for this total value by considering ω. Note that all the
goods in the set
⋃
k∈H{gk} are integrally allocated under ω. Hence, at least (n − h) agents do
not receive any good from the set
⋃
k∈H{gk}. The cumulative value derived by these agents
under ω is at least αℓ(n − h), since mink v(ωk) = αℓ. Using Equation (7) and the fact that h ≤ t,
we get
αℓ(n− h) ≤ (1 + ε)tℓ+ αℓ(t− h+ 1) + ℓ(n− t− 1).
Simplification gives that t ≥ (α−1)(n−1)α+ε , which can be further simplified to obtain
(n− t) ≤
n(1 + ε) + α− 1
α+ ε
≤
n(1 + ε)
α
+
α− 1
α
≤
n(1 + ε)
α
+ 1.
Recall that NSW(x) ≥ NSW(x′). Using the above relation with Equations (5) and (6) gives
NSW(x)
NSW(ω)
≥
NSW(x′)
NSW(ω)
≥
(∏h
i=1 v(xi)× (αℓ)
(t−h) × ℓn−t
)1/n
(∏h
i=1 v(xi)× (αℓ)
(n−h)
)1/n = α−n−tn ≥ α− 1+εα − 1n . (8)
The −1/n term in the exponent of α can be neglected via a scaling argument, as follows: Construct
(for analysis only) a scaled-up instance I ′ consisting of c ≥ 1 copies of the instance I . For any alloca-
tion y that is ε-EF1 for I , the allocation y′ = (y,y, . . . ,y) is ε-EF1 for I ′. Write n′, α′, ℓ′, ω′ to denote
the analogues of n, α, ℓ, ω in I ′. Also, let ω˜ denote the fractional allocation (ω, ω, . . . , ω) in I ′. It is
easy to see that n′ = cn, α′ = α, and ℓ′ = ℓ. Moreover,
NSW(y)
NSW(ω)
=
NSW(y′)
NSW(ω˜)
≥
NSW(y′)
NSW(ω′)
≥ α−
1+ε
α
− 1
cn ,
where the first term is for the instance I , and the remaining terms are for the instance I ′. In addition,
the relation NSW(ω′) ≥ NSW(ω˜) follows from the optimality of ω′ for I ′. By choosing a sufficiently
large value of c, the term −1/cn in the exponent can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore, the lower
bound in Equation (8) is (arbitrarily close to) α−
1+ε
α . Finally, notice that the function z−
1+ε
z with z ≥ 0
is minimized at z = e. This gives a lower bound of e−(1+ε)/e, as desired.
We will now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3. The proof relies on transforming a general fair
division instance into one with identical valuations, and showing that the Nash social welfare of the
allocation returned by Alg is preserved in this transformation.
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Theorem 3. For additive valuations, there exists a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation algorithm for the
Nash social welfare maximization problem.
Proof. For a given instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, let z and q denote the allocation and the price vector
respectively that are returned by Alg when provided as input the ε-rounded version of I (the pa-
rameter ε is set to a small constant). Let αi 6= 0 denote the maximum bang per buck ratio of agent i
with respect to q. Construct a scaled instance Isc = 〈[n], [m],Vsc〉 such that vsci,j =
1
αi
vi,j for all i and
j.13 Then, for any allocation y, NSW(y) in Isc is 1
(
∏n
i=1 αi)
1/n times NSW(y) in the original instance I .
Therefore, in order to obtain the desired approximation guarantee, it suffices to show that z achieves
an approximation factor of 1.45 in the scaled instance Isc.
Let ω denote a Nash optimal (integral) allocation in the original instance I . By the above argu-
ment, ω is Nash optimal in the scaled instance Isc as well. Additionally, for each agent i in Isc, we
have that vsci,j = qj for all j ∈ MBBi, and v
sc
i,j < qj for all j /∈ MBBi. Therefore, for any agent i, we
have vsc(zi) = q(zi) (since, from Lemma 3, we have that zi ⊆ MBBi), and v
sc
i (ωi) ≤ q(ωi). Conse-
quently, the Nash social welfare of the computed allocation z and the optimal allocation ω satisfy the
following relations in the scaled instance Isc:(
n∏
i=1
vsci (zi)
)1/n
=
(
n∏
i=1
q(zi)
)1/n
(9)
and (
n∏
i=1
vsci (ωi)
)1/n
≤
(
n∏
i=1
q(ωi)
)1/n
. (10)
We will further transform the valuations in Isc to obtain an instance I id = 〈[n], [m],V id〉with identical
valuations. Specifically, we set vidi,j = qj for all i and j. We know from Lemma 3 that z is 3ε-pEF1
with respect to q in the original instance I , and that zi ⊆ MBBi for each agent i ∈ [n]. It then follows
that z is 3ε-EF1 in the identical valuations instance I id. Furthermore, when ε = 1300 , the allocation z
is 1100–EF1 in I
id, and therefore from Lemma 1, we have that(
n∏
i=1
q(zi)
)1/n
≥ e−(1+0.01)/emax
y∈X
(
n∏
i=1
q(yi)
)1/n
≥
1
1.45
max
y∈X
(
n∏
i=1
q(yi)
)1/n
≥
1
1.45
(
n∏
i=1
q(ωi)
)1/n
≥
1
1.45
(
n∏
i=1
vsci (ωi)
)1/n
(using Equation (10)).
The previous inequality and Equation (9) together give us an approximation factor of 1.45 under the
valuation profile Vsc: (
n∏
i=1
vsci (zi)
)1/n
≥
1
1.45
(
n∏
i=1
vsci (ωi)
)1/n
,
13A similar scaling was used by Cole and Gkatzelis (2015) in their analysis of NSW approximation.
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which provides a similar approximation guarantee for the original instance I . Finally, observe that
the allocation z can be computed in polynomial time for the above choice of ε (Lemma 7). This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.
8 Concluding Remarks
We studied the problem of finding a fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods. Our work
provided a framework based on integral Fisher markets and an (approximate) price envy-freeness
condition resulting in a pseudopolynomial algorithm for finding an EF1 and PO allocation, and a
polynomial time 1.45-approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare. Determining whether there
exists a (strongly) polynomial time algorithm for the problem of finding an EF1 and PO allocation
remains an interesting direction for future work. Extensions of our results to more general classes of
valuations (e.g., submodular) will also be interesting.
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A Appendix-I
A.1 BuildHierarchy subroutine
This section provides a polynomial time subroutine for constructing the hierarchy of agent i.
Given an allocation x, we use x−1(j) to refer to the agent that owns the good j, i.e., x−1(j) = i if
j ∈ xi. Similarly, for a set of goods G ⊆ [m], we write x
−1(G) to refer to the set of all agents that own
one or more goods in the set G. Also, given a set S ⊆ [n] of agents, we writeMBBS to refer to the set⋃
i∈S MBBi.
ALGORITHM 2: BuildHierarchy
Input: An agent i, an allocation x, and a price vector p.
Output: A hierarchy structure Hi = {H
0
i ,H
1
i , . . . } for agent i.
// Initialization
1 H0i ← {i} /* i is the Level-0 agent */
2 ℓ← 0
// Build the hierarchy level-wise
3 whileHℓi is non-empty do
4 Hℓ+1i ← x
−1
(
MBBHℓ
i
)
\ {∪ℓk=0H
k
i }
/* Add to Hℓ+1i any agent that is not currently in the hierarchy and is reachable from
some member of Hℓi via an MBB-allocation edge. */
5 ℓ← ℓ+ 1
6 returnHi = {H0i ,H
1
i , . . . }.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
This section provides the proof of Lemma 4. Throughout this section, we will use it ∈ [n] to denote
the least spender at time step t. Additionally, we will use xt and pt to denote the allocation and the
price vector respectively at time step t.
Lemma 4 (Running time bound for power-of–(1 + ε) instance). Given any power-of-(1 + ε) instance
as input, Alg terminates in time O
(
poly(m,n, 1ε , ln vmax)
)
, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 9 and 10, which are stated below.
Lemma 9. Phase 2 of Alg can continue for at most poly(n,m, 1ε ) · lnmvmax consecutive time steps before a
Phase 3 step occurs.
Lemma 10. Alg can perform at most n log(1+ε)mvmax number of Phase 3 steps.
The proofs of Lemmas 9 and 10 rely on several intermediate results (Lemmas 11 to 15).
Lemma 11. The spending of the least spender cannot decrease with time, i.e., for each time step t, pt(xtit) ≤
pt+1(xt+1it+1).
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Proof. There are exactly three ways in which the spending of the least spender can change between
consecutive time steps: (1) due to a swap operation in Phase 2, (2) a price-rise in Phase 3, or (3) an
identity change. In Phase 2, the spending of the least spender can be affected via a swap operation
only if it receives a good, which results in an increase in its spending. In that case, the agent losing the
good cannot become the new least spender due to the ε-path-violator condition. Similarly, in Phase
3, the spending of the least spender cannot decrease since the prices of the goods can only increase.
Finally, any identity change, either in Phase 2 or in Phase 3, occurs only when the spending of the old
least spender grows beyond that of the new one, once again implying the stated condition.
Lemma 12. Let t denote a Phase 3 step. Then, pt(xtit) ≤ mvmax.
Lemma 13. Alg can perform at most poly(n,m) number of consecutive swap operations before either the
identity of the least spender changes or a Phase 3 step occurs.
The proofs of Lemmas 12 and 13 rely on a number of intermediate results, and we defer them to
Sections A.2.1 and A.2.2 respectively.
Lemma 14. Consider a series of consecutive time steps consisting entirely of Phase 2 operations, i.e., either
swap operations or change in the identity of the least spender. Let t be a time step at which an agent i ceases
to be the least spender, and let t′ > t be the first time step after t at which i once again becomes the least
spender. Let (x,p) and (x′,p′) denote the corresponding allocation and price vectors. Then, either xi ( x
′
i or
p′(x′i) ≥ (1 + ε)p(xi), or both.
Proof. Observe that a change in the identity of the least spender during Phase 2 is always preceded
by the previous least spender receiving a good via a swap operation. This means that agent i must
receive a good at time t. If, in addition, agent i does not lose any good during the time interval
between t and t′, then we already have that xi ( x
′
i and the claim follows. Therefore, for the rest of
the proof, we will assume that agent i loses one or more goods between t and t′.
Among all time steps between t and t′ at which agent i loses a good, let t denote the last one. Let
j ∈ [m] denote the good lost by agent i at time t, and let k denote the least spender at that time. Also,
let (x,p) denote the allocation and price vector just before i loses the good j.
Lemma 11 that the spending of the least spender cannot decrease with time. Thus,
p(xk) ≥ p(xi). (11)
Since agent i loses the good j at time t, it must be an ε-path-violator with respect to (x,p). Hence,
p(xi \ {j}) > (1 + ε)p(xk). (12)
Finally, since j is the last good lost by i before the time step t′, we have that
p′(x′i) ≥ p(xi \ {j}). (13)
Equations (11) to (13) together give us the desired result.
Lemma 15. The identity of the least spender can change at most poly(n,m, 1ε ) · lnmvmax number of times
during Phase 2 before a Phase 3 step occurs.
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Proof. Recall from Lemma 14 that each time Alg cycles back to an agent i as the least spender, either
the allocation of i strictly grows by at least one good, or its spending grows at least by amultiplicative
factor of (1 + ε). By pigeonhole principle, for every (n + 1) identity change events, Alg must cycle
back to some (fixed) agent. Therefore, for every (n+ 1) consecutive identity change events (possibly
interspersed with swap operations), either that agent obtains an extra good (without losing any) or
its spending grows by a factor of (1 + ε). This observation, along with the fact that the spending of
the least spender can never decrease with time (Lemma 11), implies that for everym(n + 1) identity
changes, the spending of the least spender must increase by a factor of (1 + ε). Furthermore, we
know from Lemma 12 that the spending of the least spender at the beginning of each Phase 3 step is
at most mvmax. Hence, assuming that the initial spending of the least spender is at least 1 (refer to
Section B.1 for explanation of why this assumption is without loss of generality), there can be at most
poly(m,n) · log(1+ε)mvmax identity changes during Phase 2 before a Phase 3 step occurs. By using
ln(1 + ε) ≥ ε− ε2, we obtain the desired result.
Lemma 9. Phase 2 of Alg can continue for at most poly(n,m, 1ε ) · lnmvmax consecutive time steps before a
Phase 3 step occurs.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 13 and 15.
Lemma 10. Alg can perform at most n log(1+ε)mvmax number of Phase 3 steps.
Proof. Recall that each Phase 3 step increases the prices of the goods owned by the members of the
hierarchy by a multiplicative factor of α, where α = min{α1, α2, α3}. Since the algorithm terminates
if α = α2, we will assume for the rest of the proof that α is equal to either α1 or α3.
Price-rise by α = α1: In order to bound the number of price-rise steps with α = α1, we will show
that each such step multiplicatively increases the spending of the least spender by a positive integral
power of (1 + ε). Then, by using Lemmas 11 and 12, we can conclude that there can be at most
log(1+ε)mvmax price-rise steps with α = α1.
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Notice that since the valuations are power-of-(1 + ε), the initial prices of all the goods at the end
of Phase 1 are also power-of-(1 + ε). We claim that if all prices are power-of-(1 + ε) prior to the
price-rise step with α = α1, then the same continues to hold after the price-rise. Indeed, if all prices
are power-of-(1 + ε), then all bang per buck ratios must also be (possibly negative) integral powers
of (1 + ε). Moreover, α1 is itself a ratio of two such bang per buck ratios, and thus it must also be
an integral power of (1 + ε). Each price-rise by α = α1 multiplicatively increments the prices by a
power of (1 + ε). Furthermore, this increment must be strict because the price-rise step introduces
a new MBB edge between a member of the hierarchy and a good outside the hierarchy. Hence, the
spending of the least spender grows by a positive integral power of (1 + ε).
Price-rise by α = α3: We will now provide a bound on the number of price-rise steps with α = α3.
While the price-rise in this case is also in integral powers of (1+ ε) (by definition of α3), the spending
of the least spender may not increase by the same factor after each such step due to a possible change
in the identity of the least spender. However, by pigeonhole principle, the algorithm must cycle
back to the same agent after n steps, and therefore the spending of the least spender must grow
multiplicatively (at least) by a positive integral power of (1 + ε) after every n price-rise steps with
α = α3. By a similar reasoning as for the case α = α1, we get the desired result.
14We are assuming here that the initial spending of the least spender is at least 1; refer to Section B.1 for an explanation
of why this assumption is without loss of generality.
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A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 12
The proof of Lemma 12 relies on a series of intermediate results (Lemmas 16 to 19), which we state
and prove below. We will use Et ⊂ [n] to denote the set of all 3ε-violators at time t. That is,
Et :=
{
h ∈ [n] : (1 + 3ε)pt(xtit) < p
t(xth \ {j}) for every good j ∈ x
t
h
}
.
Lemma 16. Let t and t′ be two time steps at which Alg performs a price-rise in Phase 3 such that t < t′.
Then, Et′ ⊆ Et.
Proof. It suffices to prove Lemma 16 for consecutive price-rise steps t and t′ (possibly including Phase
2 events between them). Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists an agent k ∈ Et′ \Et. Our proof
consists of two main arguments: First, we will show that k cannot turn into a 3ε-violator due to the
price-rise at time t. (This would imply that the only way k can turn into a 3ε-violator is via a swap
operation.) Second, we will show that if there is a swap operation at time t (for some t < t < t′) that
turns k into a 3ε-violator, then there is a subsequent swap operation at (t + 1) that turns it back into
a non-ε-violator. This will contradict the fact that k is a 3ε-violator at the beginning of the price-rise
step at t′.
We will start by showing that k cannot turn into a 3ε-violator due to the price-rise at time t. We
perform case analysis for whether or not k ∈ Hit . To begin with, suppose that k ∈ Hit . Then, k cannot
be an ε-violator before the price-rise at time t (otherwise it would also be an ε-path-violator, and Alg
would continue with Phase 2). Thus,
(1 + ε)pt(xtit) ≥ p
t(xtk \ {j}) for some j ∈ x
t
k.
A similar condition continues to hold after the price-rise, since prices are always raised uniformly.
(1 + ε)pt+1(xt+1it ) ≥ p
t+1(xt+1k \ {j}) for some j ∈ x
t+1
k . (14)
Therefore, at time (t + 1), agent k cannot be an ε-violator with respect to any agent in Hit . It
is, however, possible that k is an ε-violator at time (t + 1) with respect to some agent outside Hit .
Nevertheless, we will show that k cannot be a 3ε-violator. Specifically, let h be the least spender
outside Hit at time t, i.e., h ∈ argmina∈[n]\Hit p
t(xta). Recall that the condition α ≤ α3 in Line 20 of
Alg implies that
(1 + ε)pt+1(xt+1h ) ≥ p
t+1(xt+1it ).
Along with Equation (14), this gives
(1 + ε)2pt+1(xt+1h ) ≥ p
t+1(xt+1k \ {j}) for some j ∈ x
t+1
k .
Since ε < 1, we have that (1+ ε)2 < 1+ 3ε, which implies that k is not a 3ε-violator at time (t+1)
with respect to any agent.
Now suppose that k /∈ Hit . Since k /∈ Et by assumption, and the spending of the agents outside
the hierarchy remains unaffected due to the price-rise, we once again get that k /∈ Et+1. This proves
that k cannot turn into a 3ε-violator due to the price-rise at time t.
We will now proceed to show that if there is a swap operation at time t (for some t < t < t′) that
turns k into a 3ε-violator, then there is a subsequent swap operation at (t+1) that turns it back into a
non-ε-violator. Suppose that k (at level ℓ in the hierarchy) becomes a 3ε-violator after receiving a good
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j via a swap at time step t. Recall that a swap operation involves transferring a good from an agent at
a higher level to another agent at a lower level in the hierarchy. Furthermore, Alg performs a swap
for an agent at level (ℓ + 1) only if no agent in the levels 1, 2, . . . , ℓ is an ε-path violator. Therefore,
k cannot be an ε-path violator before the swap, i.e., there exists a good j′ on an alternating path of
length 2ℓ from it to k such that
(1 + ε)pt(xtit) ≥ p
t(xtk \ {j
′}).
Moreover, since k becomes a 3ε-violator (and hence, an ε-path violator) after receiving the good j, we
have that
(1 + 3ε)pt+1(xt+1it+1
) < pt+1(xtk ∪ {j} \ {j
′}). (15)
Since neither the identity (or allocation) of the least spender nor the price-vector changes in this
process, Equation (15) can be rewritten as
(1 + 3ε)pt(xtit) < p
t(xtk ∪ {j} \ {j
′}). (16)
Notice that the swap involving the good j does not affect the alternating path from it to k via the
good j′, and therefore k continues to be at level ℓ. In fact, k is the only agent on level ℓ or below that
is an ε-path-violator. Therefore, in a subsequent swap operation, the good j′ will be taken away from
k, resulting in the allocation (xtk ∪ {j} \ {j
′}) for k. After this step, agent k once again becomes a
non-ε-violator with respect to the good j, providing the desired contradiction.
Lemma 17. Let t and t′ be two time steps at which Alg performs a price-rise in Phase 3 such that t < t′.
Then, for any agent k ∈ Et′ , x
t′
k ⊆ x
t
k.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 16. Suppose, for contradiction, that there
exists a good j ∈ xt
′
k \ x
t
k for some agent k ∈ Et′ . Then, agent k must have acquired the good j via a
swap operation at time t (between t and t′). This means that agent k cannot be an ε-path violator at
time t, and thus cannot be a 3ε-violator. By an argument similar to Lemma 16, we can argue that k
cannot be a 3ε-violator at any subsequent price-rise event, contradicting k ∈ Et′ .
Lemma 18. At the beginning of each price-rise step at time t, Et ∩Hit = ∅.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists an agent k ∈ Et ∩ Hit . Since k ∈ Et, we have
(1 + 3ε)pt(xtit) < p
t(xtk \ {j}) for every good j ∈ x
t
k. Furthermore, since k ∈ Hit , there must exist
an alternating path from the least spender it to k that involves some good j
′ ∈ xtk. Thus, k is also an
ε-path violator, which means thatAlgwill perform a swap operation in Phase 2 at time t, as opposed
to a price-rise operation.
Lemma 19. Let t and t′ be two time steps at which Alg performs a price-rise such that t < t′. Then, the
spending of any agent k ∈ Et′ at time t
′ is at most that at time t, i.e., pt
′
(xt
′
k ) ≤ p
t(xtk).
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that t and t′ correspond to consecutive price-rise steps
(possibly including Phase 2 events between them). From Lemma 17, we have that xt
′
k ⊆ x
t
k. Therefore,
it suffices to show that pt
′
(xt
′
k ) = p
t(xt
′
k ), i.e., the prices of the goods in the set x
t′
k do not vary between
t and t′. We know from Lemma 16 that Et ⊇ Et′ , and hence k ∈ Et. Lemma 18 then implies that
k /∈ Hit , which means that the price-rise step at time t does not affect the prices of the goods owned
by k at time t, namely xtk. Since x
t′
k ⊆ x
t
k, the same holds for the goods in x
t′
k . The lemma now follows
since, by assumption, there is no other price-rise step between t and t′.
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We will finish this section with a proof of Lemma 12.
Lemma 12. Let t denote a Phase 3 step. Then, pt(xtit) ≤ mvmax.
Proof. Notice that the set Et must be non-empty at the beginning of each price-rise step, otherwise
(x,p) is already 3ε-pEF1 and Alg will terminate before entering Phase 3. By definition of the set Et,
the spending of the least spender it is at most the spending of any agent h ∈ Et, i.e., p
t(xtit) ≤ p
t(xth)
for every h ∈ Et. From Lemma 19, we know that p
t(xth) ≤ p
0(x0h), where the superscript “0” denotes
the first price-rise event. The spending of agent h just before the first price-rise event, namely p0(x0h),
is at most the sum of prices of all goods right after Phase 1 (this is because Phase 2 does not affect the
prices of the goods). The price of any good at the end of Phase 1 is simply the highest valuation of an
agent for that good. Therefore, pt(xtit) ≤ p
t(xth) ≤ mvmax.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 13
LetHit denote the hierarchy at time step t. The level of an agent h ∈ [n] at time t is defined as
level(h, t) :=
{
ℓ if h ∈ Hℓit , and
n if h /∈ Hit .
Notice that for any agent h ∈ Hit , level(h, t) ≤ n − 1, since there are n agents overall, and the least
spender it is assumed to be at level 0.
We say that a good j ∈ [m] is critical for an agent h ∈ Hℓit \ {it} at time t if j ∈ x
t
h, and there is an
alternating path of length 2ℓ from the least spender it to h that includes the good j. We denote the set
of all critical goods for an agent h at time t by Gh,t. It is easy to see that the set Gh,t is non-empty if
and only if h ∈ Hℓit \ {it} for some ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . . }.
Lemma 13. Alg can perform at most poly(n,m) number of consecutive swap operations before either the
identity of the least spender changes or a Phase 3 step occurs.
Proof. We will show via a potential function argument that each swap operation causes a drop of at
least 1 in the value of a non-negative function that is bounded above by poly(m,n), implying that
Alg can perform at most poly(m,n) such swaps.
Suppose that Alg performs a swap operation at time step t that involves transferring a good
j ∈ [m] from an agent hℓ at level ℓ to another agent hℓ−1 at level ℓ − 1. Consider the function f(t)
defined as
f(t) :=
∑
h∈[n]\{it}
m (n− level(h, t)) + |Gh,t|.
Notice that f(t) is always non-negative, and its maximum value is at most poly(n,m), since
level(h, t) ≥ 0 and |Gh,t| ≤ m for every agent h ∈ [n] \ {it}. The rest of the proof will separately
analyze the contribution of the agents hℓ, hℓ−1, and any other agent h ∈ [n] \ {it, hℓ−1, hℓ} to the term
f(t).
First, consider the agent hℓ. We will argue that either level(hℓ, t + 1) = level(hℓ, t) and Ghℓ,t+1 (
Ghℓ,t, or level(hℓ, t+ 1) > level(hℓ, t). Notice that both conditions cause the potential term to drop by
at least 1 (all else being constant): The first condition simply causes a drop of at least 1 in the term
|Gh,t|without a change in the level term; the second term causes a drop of at least 1 in the level term,
which is scaled by a factor of m, and thus cannot be offset by any possible increase in the critical
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goods term. The reason why one of these conditions always holds is as follows: Notice that j is a
critical good for hℓ before the swap takes place, i.e., j ∈ Gh,t. If j is the only good in the setGh,t, then,
after the swap operation, either hℓ moves to a higher level (than ℓ) in the hierarchy, or it ceases to be a
member of the hierarchy. Either way, we have that level(hℓ, t+ 1) > level(hℓ, t). On the other hand, if
j is not the only good in the setGh,t, then the level of hℓ does not change upon the loss of the good j.
However, since hℓ does not receive any good during the swap operation, and none of the previously
non-critical goods become critical, we have that Ghℓ,t+1 ( Ghℓ,t.
Next, consider the agent hℓ−1. We will show that level(hℓ−1, t+1) = level(hℓ−1, t) and Ghℓ−1,t+1 =
Ghℓ−1,t, implying that all else being constant, the potential cannot increase. Notice that a swap op-
eration can (possibly) create one or more new alternating paths from the least spender i to the agent
hℓ−1. We will argue that any such path must be of length at least 2ℓ, and therefore it can neither lower
the level nor make j a critical good for hℓ−1. Indeed, any new path to hℓ−1 must involve the good j
and another agent h′ such that j ∈ MBBh′ . Since j was previously owned by hℓ, there must already
exist an alternating path from i to hℓ via h
′ before the swap takes place. Since the level of hℓ before the
swap is ℓ, any such path must be of length at least 2(ℓ− 1), implying that level(h′, t) ≥ ℓ− 1. This, in
turn, means that any new path to hℓ−1 (via h
′) must be of length at least 2ℓ, which is strictly longer
than the existing path of length 2(ℓ− 1) that defines its level.
Finally, we will show that the contribution of any agent h ∈ [n] \ {i, hℓ−1, hℓ} to the potential f
does not increase due to the swap operation. To begin with, note that level(h, t + 1) ≥ level(h, t): the
only way in which the level of agent h can decrease is via a newly created alternating path (at time
t+ 1) from i to h that involves the good j (this is because any path from i to h that does not involve
the good j must also have existed prior to the swap operation). Any such path must consist of two
parts: (1) an alternating path from i to agent hℓ−1 and (2) an alternating path P from hℓ−1 to h. Since
the level of hℓ−1 remains unchanged and all the edges in P were present before the swap operation,
we get that level(h, t+ 1) ≥ level(h, t).
An analogous argument shows that the distance (i.e., the length of the shortest alternating path)
of any good j′ 6= j from i cannot decrease after the swap operation. This observation implies that
the containment Gh,t+1 ⊆ Gh,t does not hold only if the level of h strictly increases: consider a
j′ ∈ Gh,t+1 \ Gh,t (if one exists) and note that j
′ is allocated to h even before the swap (the allocation
of agent h does not change at time t). Since j′ was not a critical good for h before the swap, its distance
from imust have be strictly greater than level(h, t). The distance of j′ from i defines the level of agent
h at time t + 1, hence we get that level(h, t + 1) > level(h, t). In the potential f , for any agent h an
increase in the level compensates for any possible change in the cardinality of the critical set of goods.
Hence, the contribution of any agent h ∈ [n] \ {i, hℓ−1, hℓ} to f cannot increase at time t.
Thus, we have shown that for each agent h ∈ [n] \ {i}, the contribution to the potential does not
increase and, in fact, for agent hℓ it strictly decreases. This forces the potential function to drop by at
least 1 after each swap operation, giving us the desired result.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Let p denote the price vector returned by Alg on the input instance I ′. Our first result in this section
(Lemma 20) provides a bound on the final price of a good j ∈ [m].
Lemma 20. For any good j ∈ [m], pj ≤ m
2v3max, where pj is the price of good j upon termination of Alg.
Proof. Let {t1, t2, . . . , tℓ} denote the set of all time steps (during the execution of Alg) at which the
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price of good j increases, and let {αt1 , αt2 , . . . , αtℓ} denote the corresponding set of multiplicative
price jumps. The set of least spenders at these time steps is given by {it1 , it2 , . . . , itℓ}. Let s(t) :=
pt(xtit) denote the spending of the least spender at time step t.
15 Our proof relies on the following
two claims:
Claim 1: s(t2) ≥ αt1s(t1), s(t3) ≥ αt2s(t2), . . . , s(tℓ) ≥ αtℓ−1s(tℓ−1), and
Claim 2: αtℓ ≤ mvmax.
Claim 1 shows that the spending of the least spender (say, s(ti+1)) before a price-rise involving the
good j is at least that of the previous least spender (i.e., the agent that was the least spender for the
previous price-rise involving the good j) after the corresponding price-rise (i.e., αtis(ti)).
16 Claim 2
provides a bound on the final price-rise involving the good j. Before proving these claims, we will
describe how they lead to the desired relation pj ≤ m2v3max.
First, observe that Claim 1 implies that s(tℓ) ≥ αt1αt2 . . . αtℓ−1s(t1). Using Lemma 12 for the
time step tℓ, we have that s(tℓ) ≤ mvmax. This implies that αt1αt2 . . . αtℓ−1 ≤ mvmax, since the initial
spending of each agent (i.e., spending at the end of Phase 1) is assumed to be at least 1 (Section B.1),
and the spending of the least spender cannot decrease with time (Lemma 11). Along with Claim 2,
this gives αt1αt2 . . . αtℓ−1αtℓ ≤ m
2v2max. The final price of good j is given by pj = p
0
jαt1αt2 . . . αtℓ−1αtℓ ,
where p0j denotes the price of good j at the end of Phase 1. The desired bound on pj follows by
observing that the initial price of any good is at most vmax.
We will first prove Claim 2. Recall that the price-rise factor α in Alg is chosen as α =
min{α1, α2, α3}; thus, in particular, α ≤ α2. Therefore, in order to prove a bound on αℓ, we can
assume without loss of generality that α = α2. Under this assumption, the price-rise step in this case
involves raising the spending of the least spender it until the allocation becomes 3ε-pEF1 (or equiv-
alently, until the set Et of the ε-violators at time step t becomes empty). Using arguments similar
to those in the proof of Lemma 12, we can show that spending of the highest spender in Et can be
at most its initial spending (i.e., spending at the end of Phase 1), hence at most mvmax. Thus, the
price-rise factor αℓ is also at mostmvmax. This proves Claim 2.
We will now prove Claim 1 for the time-steps t1 and t2 (that is, wewill show that s(t2) ≥ αt1s(t1));
the analysis for other time-steps follows analogously. Note that if the identity of the least-spender
does not change after a price-rise at t1, then we have that s(t1 + 1) = αt1s(t1). Additionally, since
the spending of the least spender is non-decreasing with time (Lemma 11), we have that s(t2) ≥
s(t1+1) = αt1s(t1), and the claim follows. Therefore, we will assume, without loss of generality, that
the identity of the least-spender necessarily changes after the price-rise at t1.
For ease of presentation, we will use [ta, tb] := {ta, ta + 1, . . . , tb − 1, tb} and [ta, tb) := {ta, ta +
1, . . . , tb−1} to denote the set of all time-steps (both Phase 2 and Phase 3) between ta and tb including
and excluding tb respectively.
17 In addition, we will say that an agent k ∈ [n] experiences price-rise at
time t if k belongs to the hierarchy during the price-rise at time-step t, i.e., k ∈ Hit . Similarly, we will
say that agent k experiences price-rise during [ta, tb] (respectively, [ta, tb)) if k experiences price-rise
for some t ∈ [ta, tb] (respectively, t ∈ [ta, tb)).
Let τ ∈ [t1, t2] be a time-step (either Phase 2 or Phase 3) such that
15Recall from Section 5.1 that spending ‘at time step t’ refers to the spending before the event at time step t takes place.
16Recall that in a price-rise step involving good j, the spending of the least spender grows by the same multiplicative
factor as the price of good j.
17Here, ta and tb are any two time-steps and do not necessarily correspond to price-rise steps involving good j.
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1. the least-spender at τ , namely iτ , experiences price-rise during [t1, τ), and
2. there does not exist τˆ ∈ [t1, t2] with τˆ < τ such that the least-spender at τˆ , namely iτˆ , experi-
ences price-rise during [t1, τˆ).
Among all the time-steps in [t1, τ) at which the agent iτ (as defined above) experiences price-rise,
let τ ′ be the last one. Our proof relies on the following three observations:
Fact I: There exists τ ∈ [t1, t2] that satisfies condition (1).
Fact II: The spending of iτ at time-step τ
′ + 1 is at least αt1s(t1), i.e., p
τ ′+1(xτ
′+1
iτ
) ≥ αt1s(t1).
Fact III: The spending of iτ at τ is at least that at τ
′ + 1, i.e., pτ (xτiτ ) ≥ p
τ ′+1(xτ
′+1
iτ
).
Fact I makes the above formulation well-defined, whereas Facts II and III give us the desired
implication via the following chain of inequalities:
s(t2) ≥ s(τ) = p
τ (xτiτ ) ≥ p
τ ′+1(xτ
′+1
iτ
) ≥ αt1s(t1).
The first inequality holds because the spending of the least spender is non-decreasing with time
(Lemma 11), the equality denotes change of notation, and the final two inequalities follow from Facts
II and III. The remainder of the proof consists of proving Facts I-III.
Proof of Fact I: Suppose, for contradiction, that condition (1) is violated for every τ ∈ [t1, t2]. That
is, for every τ ∈ [t1, t2], the least-spender at τ , namely iτ , does not experience price-rise during [t1, τ).
For each t ∈ [t1, t2], let Ht denote the set of agents in the hierarchy, and letMt (the “marked” set)
denote the set of agents that experience price-rise during [t1, t). We setMt1 := {∅}, i.e., all agents are
“unmarked” before the price-rise at t1. After the price-rise at t1, we haveMt1+1 = Ht1 , i.e., we “mark”
the agents that experience price-rise. Thus, the contradiction hypothesis is equivalent to requiring
that for every τ ∈ [t1, t2], iτ is unmarked at time-step τ , i.e., iτ /∈ Mτ . In particular, we require the
agent it2 to be unmarked at t2.
The update rule forMt is given by
Mt+1 =
{
Mt if t is a Phase 2 step,
Mt ∪Ht if t is a Phase 3 step.
Indeed, no agent experiences price-rise during Phase 2 and therefore the marked set remains
unchanged. For a Phase 3 operation at time-step t, only the agents in the hierarchy Ht experience
price-rise at t, and they are added to the current setMt. Observe that a marked agent never becomes
unmarked.
We will call a good marked (at t) if it is owned by a marked agent (at t), i.e., j′ ∈ [m] is marked at
t if j′ ∈ xtk for some k ∈ Mt. Notice that at the time-step t1 + 1, the agents in [n] \ Ht1 constitute the
unmarked set, and no such agent has an alternating path to a marked good, i.e., any good in the set{
∪k∈Mt1+1x
t1+1
k
}
.18
The key observation underlying our proof is that for any time-step t ∈ [t1 + 1, t2), if there is no
alternating path from an unmarked agent (i.e., an agent in [n] \Mt) to a marked good (i.e., a good
18This is because the price-rise at t1 forces the removal of all MBB edges between the agents in [n] \ Ht1 and the goods
in
{
∪k∈Ht1x
t1+1
k
}
. Therefore, the set of agents with an alternating path to some good in
{
∪k∈Ht1x
t1+1
k
}
is a subset ofHt.
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in the set
{
∪k∈Mtx
t
k
}
), then the same holds for the time-step t + 1, i.e., there is no alternating path
from an agent in [n] \ Mt+1 to a good in the set
{
∪k∈Mt+1x
t+1
k
}
. Before proving this observation,
notice that it gives us the desired contradiction as follows: By the contradiction hypothesis, the agent
it2 is unmarked for all t ∈ [t1, t2]. In addition, it can be shown that a marked good never becomes
unmarked, i.e.,
{
∪k∈Mtx
t
k
}
⊆
{
∪k∈Mt+1x
t+1
k
}
. (Indeed, a marked good cannot be allocated to an
unmarked agent in Phase 2 because a swap is always along an existing alternating path. Similarly, in
Phase 3, any newly createdMBB edge must be from some agent in the hierarchy Ht. By the update
rule, such an agent is included in the marked setMt+1.) In particular, the good j is marked at time-
step t1+1, and stays so thereafter. By repeated application of the above observation, we get that there
is no alternating path from the agent it2 to the good j at t = t2. This contradicts the assumption that
good j is involved in the price-rise at t2 when it2 is the least-spender.
We will now prove the aforementioned observation via induction. We have already seen that the
base case is true; indeed, since Mt1+1 = Ht1 , no agent in [n] \Mt1+1 has an alternating path to any
good in the set
{
∪k∈Mt1+1x
t1+1
k
}
. Let us assume that the observation holds for all t ∈ [t1 + 1, t
′] and
prove that it holds for t = t′ + 1, where t′ + 1 < t2. We will use case analysis depending on whether
t′ + 1 occurs during Phase 2 or Phase 3.
• Suppose that t′ + 1 is a Phase 2 operation. By the contradiction assumption, the least-spender
at t′ + 1, namely it′+1, is unmarked at t
′ + 1. Furthermore, by the induction hypothesis, there
is no alternating path from an unmarked agent to a marked good before the swap operation
at t′ + 1. This implies that all agents and goods in the hierarchy at t′ + 1, namely Ht′+1, are
unmarked. Any swap operation must therefore occur between two unmarked agents. Since
the swap operation does not create a newMBB edge, any newly created alternating path must
involve the swapped good and the new owner of this good. However, the new owner did not
have any alternating path to a marked good before the swap operation at t′ + 1. As a result, a
new alternating path from an unmarked agent to a marked good cannot be created.
• Now suppose that t′ + 1 is a Phase 3 operation. From the update rule, we know that
Mt′+2 = Mt′+1 ∪ Ht′+1. Since a price-rise operation does not change the allocation, we have
that
{
∪k∈Mt′+2x
t′+2
k
}
=
{
∪k∈Mt′+1x
t′+1
k
}⋃{
∪k∈Ht′+1x
t′+1
k
}
. Consider any agent i ∈ [n] \Mt′+2
that is unmarked at t′ + 2. Clearly, i must be unmarked at t′ + 1. By the induction hypothesis,
i does not have an alternating path to any good in the set
{
∪k∈Mt′+1x
t′+1
k
}
at t′ + 1. Further-
more, the price-rise at t′ + 1 forces the removal of anyMBB edges from i to any good in the set{
∪k∈Ht′+1x
t′+1
k
}
. Finally, any newly createdMBB edge due to the price-rise is from some agent
in Ht′+1, and any such agent is added to the marked set Mt′+2. Therefore, once again, the set
of agents that have an alternating path to some good in the set
{
∪k∈Mt′+2x
t′+2
k
}
is a subset of
Mt′+2. This finishes the proof of Fact I.
Proof of Fact II: Our proof of Fact II uses case analysis depending on whether τ ′ = t1 or τ
′ > t1.
First, suppose that τ ′ = t1. In this case, we have that
pτ
′+1(xτ
′+1
iτ
) = αt1p
τ ′(xτ
′
iτ ) ≥ αt1p
τ ′(xτ
′
iτ ′
) = αt1s(t1),
where the first equality holds because iτ experiences price-rise at τ
′ by a factor ατ ′ = αt1 , the inequal-
ity holds because iτ ′ is the least-spender at τ
′, and the final equality uses alternative notation.
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Next, suppose that τ ′ > t1. We now have that
pτ
′+1(xτ
′+1
iτ
) = ατ ′p
τ ′(xτ
′
iτ ) ≥ ατ ′p
τ ′(xτ
′
iτ ′
) ≥ (1 + ε)pτ
′
(xτ
′
iτ ′
) ≥ (1 + ε)s(t1 + 1) ≥ αt1s(t1),
where the equality holds because iτ experiences price-rise at τ
′, the first inequality holds because iτ ′
is the least-spender at τ ′, the second inequality holds because the price-rise factor is always at least
(1+ ε),19 the third inequality holds because the spending of the least-spender is non-decreasing with
time (Lemma 11), and the final inequality holds by definition of α3 (see Line 19 of Algorithm 1). This
proves Fact II.
Proof of Fact III: From condition (2), we know that for all t ∈ [τ ′ + 1, τ), the least-spender at t,
namely it, is unmarked at t. By contrast, the agent iτ remains marked throughout [τ
′ + 1, τ). As in
the proof of Fact I, note that no unmarked agent has an alternating path to a marked agent during
[t1 + 1, τ). We therefore have that none of the least-spenders iτ ′+1, iτ ′+2, . . . , iτ−1 have iτ in their
hierarchy, i.e., iτ /∈ Hτ ′+1 ∪Hτ ′+2 ∪ · · · ∪Hτ−1. This, in particular, implies that iτ does not lose a good
via a swap operation during any of these time-steps, which is the only way in which its spending can
drop. This proves Fact III, and with it, finishes the proof of Lemma 20.
The following result is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 20.
Corollary 1. p([m]) ≤ m3v3max, where p is the price vector returned by Alg upon termination.
Lemma 5. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be a fair division instance, and let ε ≤ 1
6m3v4max
. Then, an allocation x that is
fPO for I ′ (the ε-rounded version of I) is PO for the original instance I .
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that the allocation x is Pareto dominated by another integral allo-
cation y in the instance I . That is, vk(yk) ≥ vk(xk) for each agent k ∈ [n] and vi(yi) > vi(xi) for some
agent i ∈ [n]. Integrality of valuations in I implies that vi(yi) ≥ vi(xi) + 1.
For any agent k, let αk and α
′
k denote maximum bang per buck ratios (with respect to the
price vector p) in the instances I and I ′ respectively. Recall that for the ε-rounded version I ′, we
have vk,j ≤ v
′
k,j ≤ (1 + ε)vk,j for each agent k and each good j. Thus, αk = maxj∈[m] vk,j/pj ≤
maxj∈[m] v
′
k,j/pj = α
′
k.We therefore have
vk(xk)
αk
≥
v′k(xk)
(1 + ε)αk
(since I ′ is ε-rounded)
≥
v′k(xk)
(1 + ε)α′k
(since αk ≤ α
′
k)
=
p(xk)
1 + ε
, (viaMBB condition in I ′)
or equivalently,
vk(xk)
p(xk)
≥
αk
1 + ε
. (17)
In other words, the allocation x—which is guaranteed to fPO for the instance I ′—is close to being
fPO for the original instance I . The remainder of the proof will show that for a small enough ε, the
allocation x turns out to be PO for the instance I .
19When α = α3, Line 19 of Algorithm 1 forces α to be a positive integral power of (1 + ε). The same implication holds
for the case α = α1 as argued in the proof of Lemma 10. Note that we do not need to consider the case α = α2 since it only
occurs right before the termination of Alg.
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Consider the allocation y. By definition of the maximum bang per buck ratio, we have that
αkp(yk) ≥ vk(yk) for each agent k ∈ [n]. Since y Pareto dominates x in the instance I , we have
αkp(yk) ≥ vk(xk), which, along with Equation (17), implies that
p(yk) ≥
p(xk)
1 + ε
. (18)
Using a similar reasoning for the agent i (and the observation that vi(yi) ≥ vi(xi) + 1), we get
p(yi) ≥
p(xi)
1 + ε
+
1
αi
. (19)
The combined spending over all goods can be rewritten as follows:
p([m]) =
∑
k∈[n]
p(yk) (since all goods are allocated under y)
= p(yi) +
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
p(yk)
≥
p(xi)
1 + ε
+
1
αi
+
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
p(xk)
1 + ε
(from Equations (18) and (19))
=
p([m])
1 + ε
+
1
αi
(since all goods are allocated under x).
This simplifies to
ε (p([m]αi − 1) ≥ 1. (20)
It is easy to see that αi ≤ vmax, since the initial price of each good is at least 1 (by integrality of
valuations), and prices cannot decrease during the execution ofAlg. Furthermore, from Corollary 1,
we know that p([m]) ≤ m3v3max. Combining these observations, we get that ε ≥
1
m3v4max
, which
contradicts the choice of ε.
B Appendix-II
B.1 Corner Cases
In Section A.2, we showed two results—namely, Lemmas 10 and 15—that provide running time
bounds for Phase 2 and Phase 3 by showing that the spending of the least spender increases by
some multiplicative factor in every polynomial number of steps. These results implicitly assume that
the spending of the least spender is nonzero to begin with. In this section, we will show that this
assumption holds without loss of generality.
Our reasoning will depend on whether or not a given fair division instance is a Hall’s violator
(Hall, 1935). We will show that if an instance satisfies Hall’s condition (i.e, is not a Hall’s violator),
then the spending of the least spender (in Alg) becomes nonzero in O(n2) steps. If, on the other
hand, the instance is a Hall’s violator, then we can break down its analysis into (a) a smaller instance
that satisfies Hall’s condition, and (b) a trivial instance.
Consider any fair division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉. Write G = ([n], [m], E) to denote the un-
weighted bipartite graph between the set of agents and the set of goods such that E = {(i, j) : vi,j >
0}. The instance I is said to be a Hall’s violator if there exists a set of agents T ⊆ [n] that together
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(positively) value at most |T | − 1 goods, i.e., the set T violates Hall’s condition in the graph G. We
call the set T a maximal Hall’s violator if no strict superset of T is a Hall’s violator.
We will first show that an instance can be checked for Hall’s condition in O(poly(n,m)) time. Let
M be a maximum (unweighted) matching of G. A given instance I is a Hall’s violator if and only if
there exists an agent that is unmatched underM . The matchingM can be computed inO(poly(n,m))
time.
Instances that satisfy Hall’s condition Our first result in this section (Lemma 21) pertains to in-
stances that satisfy Hall’s condition.
Lemma 21. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be an input instance to Alg that satisfies power-of-(1 + ε) and Hall’s
conditions. Then, at each time step after the first O(n2) steps, the spending of each agent under Alg is strictly
greater than zero.
Proof. Observe that once the spending of an agent becomes nonzero during the run of Alg, it can
never become zero again. This is because for the spending of an agent to drop back to zero, it must
lose its last good via a swap operation in Phase 2. However, such an exchange is disallowed by the
ε-path-violator condition. Therefore, it suffices to show that the spending of each agent under Alg
becomes nonzero after the first O(n2) steps.
Let agent i be the least spender at the end of Phase 1 of Alg. Assume, without loss of generality,
that the spending of agent i at the end of Phase 1 is zero (otherwise the lemma follows immediately).
We will show that afterO(n) steps, the spending of agent i strictly exceeds zero. The desired running
time bound of O(n2) will follow from a similar argument for the other agents.
Our proof for the above claim consists of case analysis for whether or not at the end of Phase 1,
there exists some agent in the hierarchy Hi that owns two or more goods. Suppose there exists an
agent k ∈ Hi that owns two or more goods (if there are multiple such agents, tie-break in favor of
agents at a lower level in Hi, and then according to a prespecified lexicographic ordering). Then,
k must be an ε-violator, and therefore also an ε-path-violator (along some alternating path P ). Ad-
ditionally, by the choice of agent k, no agent at a lower level is an ε-path-violator. As a result, k
must lose a good under a swap operation in Phase 2 to its predecessor along path P , who acquires
two goods as a result, and becomes the new ε-path-violator. This series of swaps continues for O(n)
steps, and ends with the least spender receiving a new good.
Next, suppose that each agent in Hi owns exactly one good. Since the given instance I satisfies
Hall’s condition, and agent i does not yet own any good, there must exist an agent k /∈ Hi that
owns two or more goods. We will show that such an agent must get added to the hierarchy in O(n)
steps. Then, by the above argument, in further O(n) steps, agent imust receive a good that takes its
spending strictly above zero.
Since each agent in the hierarchy owns exactly one good, there are no ε-path-violators in Hi,
and Alg proceeds directly to Phase 3. Once again, since the least spender does not own any good,
its spending cannot change as a result of price-rise, and therefore a new agent gets added to the
hierarchy. If this agent has more than one good, then the lemma follows. Otherwise, the price-rise
step is repeated. Therefore, after O(n) such steps, an agent with two or more goods must get added
to the hierarchy, as desired.
Instances that violate Hall’s condition If the given instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 is a Hall’s violator,
then we will first find a maximum (cardinality) matching M in G. Write A ⊂ [n] to denote the set of
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agents that get matched inM . Note that the instance I ′ = 〈A, [m],V ′〉 satisfies Hall’s condition; here
V ′ is the set of valuations of the agents in A. Also, the maximality ofM ensures that for every good
j ∈ [m], there exists i ∈ A such that vi,j > 0. We will show that the allocation obtained by applying
Alg on I ′ is EF1 and fPO for I .
Let x and p denote the allocation and price vector retuned byAlg on I ′. For each of the remaining
agents i ∈ [n] \ A, set xi = {∅}. By construction, x satisfies the EF1 condition for the agents in A.
Hence, in order to show that x is EF1 for I , we need to show that this condition also holds for the
agents in [n] \ A. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists an agent b ∈ [n] \ A that EF1 envies
a ∈ A. This happens if and only if a is allocated two or more goods valued by b, i.e., |xa ∩ {j ∈ [m] :
vb,j > 0}| ≥ 2. We will show that this contradicts the fact thatM is a maximum matching, and hence
prove that x is an EF1 allocation.
Since I ′ satisfies Hall’s condition, we have from Lemma 21 that each agent in A has nonzero
spending under (x,p), i.e., for each agent i ∈ A, we have |xi| ≥ 1. Consider a new matching M
′ (in
G) wherein i ∈ A\{a} is matched to a good in xi, a is matched to some good j
′ ∈ xa, and b is matched
to a good from the non-empty set {xa \ {j
′}} ∩ {j : vb,j > 0}. The size of the matchingM
′ is strictly
greater than the size ofM , which is a contradiction. Hence, xmust be EF1 for I .
Finally, to show that x is fPO for I , we can set the endowments of all the agents in [n] \ A to be
zero, and obtain a market equilibrium (x,p) for I . Since x is the equilibrium outcome of some Fisher
market, we have from Proposition 1 that xmust be fPO for I .
B.2 Additional Market Preliminaries
Eisenberg-Gale program The convex program of Eisenberg and Gale (1959) is known to character-
ize the equilibria of the Fisher market.
maximize
n∑
i=1
ei · ln(ui)
subject to ui =
m∑
j=1
vi,jxi,j ∀ i ∈ [n],
n∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ [m], and
xi,j ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
KKT conditions and maximum bang per buck We will now describe the KKT conditions for the
Eisenberg-Gale program. Let pj denote the Lagrangian variable corresponding to the constraint∑n
i=1 xi,j ≤ 1. Then,
1. Dual feasibility: pj ≥ 0 for each j ∈ [m].
2. Complementary slackness:
(a) For each j ∈ [m], pj > 0 =⇒
∑n
i=1 xi,j = 1.
(b) For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
vi,j
pj
≤
∑m
j=1 vi,jxi,j
ei
.
(c) For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], xi,j > 0 =⇒
vi,j
pj
=
∑m
j=1 vi,jxi,j
ei
.
Under the assumptions that each good has an interested buyer (i.e., for each good j, vi,j > 0 for
some buyer i ∈ [n]) and each buyer is interested in some good (i.e., for each buyer i ∈ [n], vi,j > 0
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for some good j ∈ [m]), it can be verified that optimal solutions of the Eisenberg-Gale program
characterize the market equilibria of the corresponding Fisher market.
B.3 Second Welfare Theorem for Fisher Markets
Theorem 4. Let I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 be an instance of the fair division problem, and let x be a fractionally Pareto
efficient (fPO) allocation for I . Then, there is a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm) and an endowment vector
e = (e1, . . . , en) such that (x,p) is a market equilibrium for the market instance 〈[n], [m],V, e〉.
Proof. Our proof relies on the formulation of a linear program that characterizes the set of all fPO
allocations with respect to a given set of utilities. The market equilibrium conditions then follow
from linear programming duality and complementary slackness conditions.
Let u = (u1, . . . , un) denote the utility vector induced by the given fPO allocation x. That is,
ui =
∑m
j=1 vi,jxi,j for each i ∈ [n]. Consider the linear program given by Equation (21):
maximize
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
vi,jyi,j
subject to
m∑
j=1
vi,jyi,j ≥ ui ∀ i ∈ [n],
n∑
i=1
yi,j ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ [m], and
yi,j ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
(21)
A feasible solution of Equation (21) is a fractional allocation y that provides each buyer i ∈ [n] with
utility at least ui. Notice that the objective in Equation (21) is precisely the sum of utilities of all buyers
under y. Since the allocation x is fPO, we know that the optimal objective value must be equal to∑n
i=1 ui. Hence, x is a primal optimal solution.
The dual of the program in Equation (21) is given by Equation (22) below:
minimize
m∑
j=1
pj −
n∑
i=1
uidi
subject to pj − divi,j ≥ vi,j ∀ i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
di ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n], and
pj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ [m].
(22)
The dual variables di and pj correspond to the first and second primal constraints respectively.
Let (x,p∗,d∗) be a tuple of optimal primal and dual solutions given a utility vector u induced by
the fPO allocation x. As discussed above, the optimal primal objective must be
∑n
i=1 ui. Therefore,
by strong duality,
n∑
i=1
ui =
m∑
j=1
p∗j −
n∑
i=1
uid
∗
i . (23)
Furthermore, dual feasiblity implies that for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
p∗j − d
∗
i vi,j ≥ vi,j =⇒ p
∗
j ≥ (1 + d
∗
i )vi,j
=⇒ 1 + d∗i ≤
p∗j
vi,j
=⇒ 1 + d∗i ≤ mink
p∗k
vi,k
.
(24)
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The final inequality in Equation (24) in fact holds with an equality (otherwise the dual objective
can be improved without violating feasibility). Thus, for each i ∈ [n],
1 + d∗i = min
k
p∗k
vi,k
. (25)
Let e = (e1, . . . , en) be an endowment vector defined as ei =
∑m
j=1 p
∗
jxi,j for every i ∈ [n]. We
claim that (x,p∗) is a market equilibrium for the market instance 〈[n], [m],V, e〉. The proof of the
claim follows from checking the market equilibrium conditions, as below:
• Market clearing: Recall that pj is the dual variable corresponding to the primal constraint∑n
i=1 yi,j ≤ 1. Hence, by complementary slackness, for each j ∈ [m], either p
∗
j = 0 or∑n
i=1 xi,j = 1, which is precisely the market clearning condition.
• Budget exhaustion: This follows from the choice of the endowment vector e.
• MBB allocation: Notice that yi,j is the primal variable corresponding to the dual constraint pj −
divi,j ≥ vi,j . Therefore, by complementary slackness, we have that
xi,j > 0 =⇒ p
∗
j − d
∗
i vi,j = vi,j
=⇒ p∗j = (1 + d
∗
i )vi,j
=⇒
vi,j
p∗j
= maxk
vi,k
p∗k
(from Equation (25)),
which gives theMBB allocation condition.
We have therefore shown the existence of a price vector p∗ and an endowment vector e∗ such that
(x,p) is a market equilibrium for the market instance 〈[n], [m],V, e〉, as desired.
B.4 Utility Maximization Does Not Imply MBB Condition in Fisher Markets
Consider a Fisher market instance with two buyers and three goods. The initial endowments are
e1 = 130 for buyer 1 and e2 = 50 for buyer 2. The valuations of the buyers are as follows: v1,1 = 100,
v1,2 = 50, v1,3 = 1, v2,1 = 1, v2,2 = 99, and v2,3 = 100.
Let p = (p1, p2, p3) be a price vector, where p1 = 70, p2 = 60, and p3 = 50. The bang per buck
ratios are given by α1,1 =
10
7 , α1,2 =
5
6 , α1,3 =
1
50 , α2,1 =
1
70 , α2,2 =
99
60 , and α2,3 =
100
50 . Thus,
MBB1 = {g1} and MBB2 = {g3}. Consider an allocation x given by x1 = {g1, g2} and x2 = {g3}.
Notice that x does not satisfy the maximum bang per buck condition with respect to p. However, the
pair (x,p) is utility maximizing under the given budget constraints.
B.5 An Instance where a 1.44-approximate NSW and fPO Allocation Does Not Exist
This section provides an example of a fair division instance where the Nash social welfare of any
fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO) allocation is at most 11.44 times that of the Nash optimal allocation.
We define an instance I with n = 3 agents and m = 5 goods. The set of goods is divided into
two high-valued goods {h1, h2} and three signature goods {g1, g2, g3}. Each agent i ∈ [n] values a high-
valued good hj at vi,j = c (where c is a large constant). Each signature good gj is valued by the agent
with the same index j ∈ [n] at vj,j =
1
3 , and by every other agent i ∈ [n] \ {j} at vi,j =
1
3 − δ, where
δ ∈
(
0, 3ε2(1+3ε)
)
is a prespecified constant.
Let x be any integral fPO allocation. Claim 1 below asserts that there must exist an agent i ∈ [n]
such that xi ⊆ {gi}.
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Claim 1. Let x be any integral fPO allocation with respect to the instance I . Then, there exists an agent
i ∈ [n] such that xi ⊆ {gi}.
Proof. Observe that the number of high-valued goods is strictly smaller than the number of agents.
Hence, some agent (say agent 1) must miss out on a high-valued good under the allocation x. If
x1 ⊆ {g1}, then the claim follows. So, let us assume that agent 1 gets the signature good of some
other agent (say agent 2), i.e., g2 ∈ x1. We will now show that the claim must hold for the agent 2.
Since x is fPO, we have g2 ∈ MBB1. In addition, from Theorem 4, we know that there exists a
price vector p such that (x,p) is a market equilibrium. Hence, the bang per buck ratio of agent 1 for
the good g2 is at least that for any other good. That is,
α1,g2 ≥ α1,j for every j ∈ [m]. (26)
Furthermore, since v1,j = v2,j for every j ∈ [m] \ {g1, g2}, we have that
α1,j = α2,j for every j ∈ [m] \ {g1, g2}. (27)
Next, since v2,g2 > v1,g2 by construction, we also have thatα2,g2 > α1,g2 . Alongwith Equations (26)
and (27), this gives
α2,g2 > α1,g2
≥ α1,j for every j ∈ [m] (Equation (26))
= α2,j for every j ∈ [m] \ {g1, g2} (Equation (27)).
Similarly, since v1,g1 > v2,g1 , we have that α1,g1 > α2,g1 . Combining this with the above impli-
cations, we have that α2,g2 > α2,j for every j ∈ [m] \ {g2}. In other words, the MBB set of agent 2
consists only of the good g2. Since x is an fPO allocation, we have that x2 ⊆ MBB2 = {g2}. Hence,
the claim holds for the agent 2.
Among all allocations that are fPO for the instance I , let x denote the one with the largest Nash
social welfare. From Claim 1, we know that there exists some agent, say agent 3, such that x3 ⊆ {g3}.
If x3 = {∅}, then NSW(x) = 0. However, since there exists an fPO allocation with nonzero Nash
social welfare (namely the welfare maximizing allocation), we must have that x3 = {g3}. Indeed,
NSW(x) =
(
(c+ 13) · (c+
1
3) ·
1
3
) 1
3 for the allocation x = ({h1, g1}, {h2, g2}, {g3}).
It is easy to check that the allocation y = ({h1}, {h2}, {g1, g2, g3}) is the Nash optimal allocation
(without the fPO constraint), and NSW(y) =
(
c2 · (1− 2δ)
) 1
3 ≈ c2/3 for small δ. Therefore,
NSW(y)
NSW(x)
≥
(
c2
1
3(c+
1
3)
2
) 1
3
= 3
1
3
(
3c
3c+ 1
) 2
3
≥ 1.44 for large c.
An allocation that is PO but not fPO Notice that the allocation y in the above example is Nash
optimal, and hence, by the result of Caragiannis et al. (2016), is Pareto efficient (PO). However, there
is no agent that receives only a subset of its signature goods under y. Therefore, from Claim 1, y
cannot be fPO.
B.6 EF1 Allocations can be Highly Inefficient
Define an instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 with m = n such that vi,j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Consider an
allocation x such that xi = {gi+1} for all i ∈ [n − 1] and xn = {g1}. Clearly, x is an EF1 allocation.
However, x is highly inefficient since each agent gets a valuation of zero.
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B.7 Every Rounding of Spending Restricted Outcome Violates EF1
In this section, we provide an example of a fair division instance where every rounding of the spend-
ing restricted equilibrium defined by Cole and Gkatzelis (2015) violates EF1 condition. Our example
also serves as a counterexample for the rounding of CEEI outcomes as well.
Consider an instance with n = 5 agents and m = 7 goods. Let {g1, g2, . . . , g7} denote the set of
goods, and let v1, v2, . . . , v5 denote the valuation functions.
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7
Agent 1 3/4 0 0 3/4 0 0 0
Agent 2 0 3/4 0 3/4 0 0 0
Agent 3 0 0 3/4 3/4 0 0 0
Agent 4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 2/3 0 2/3
Agent 5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 2/3 2/3
The unique CEEI price vector is given by p =
(
3
4 ,
3
4 ,
3
4 ,
3
4 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3
)
, and the unique CEEI fractional
allocation is y =
(
{g1,
g4
3 }, {g2,
g4
3 }, {g3,
g4
3 }, {g5,
g7
2 }, {g6,
g7
2 }
)
. Since the price of each good is strictly
less than 1, y is also the unique spending restricted outcome. Let x be any rounding of the fractional
allocation y. Then, there exists an agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and an agent k ∈ {4, 5} such that xi = {gi, g4}
and xk = {gk+1}. Hence vk(xk) =
2
3 < 0.7 = vk(xi \ {j}) for any j ∈ xi, i.e., the allocation x is not
EF1.
B.8 Approximate NSWmay not be EF1 or PO
Consider an instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 withm = 2n. Each good j ∈ [2n− 2] is valued at vi,j = 2
n−1 by
each agent i ∈ [n]. In addition, we have vi,(2n−1) = vi,2n = 0 for each i ∈ [n− 1], and vn,(2n−1) = 1 and
vn,2n = 2
n − 1.
The allocation x = ({1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . . , {(2n − 1), 2n}) is Nash optimal, and NSW(x) = 2n. The
allocation y = ({1, 2, 2n}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, . . . , {(2n − 1)}) is a 2-approximation to Nash social welfare
since NSW(y) = 2n−1. However, the allocation y is not EF1, since agent n envies every other agent
by more than up to one good. Also, y is not PO since the allocation x Pareto dominates y.
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